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Abstract
The work examined whether activating a domain of a close other’s contingency of acceptance
leads to more anxiety in anticipation of an evaluative performance in that domain (Study 1), and
greater effort toward improving oneself in that domain (Study 2). In a between-group
experimental design, contingencies of acceptance were manipulated by a guided visualization of
a close other whose acceptance was perceived either as non-contingent (intrinsic), contingent on
a task-irrelevant domain (physical appearance), or contingent on a task-relevant domain
(competence). The effects of the acceptance contingency condition on anxiety and effort were
not statistically significant. However, in Study 1, six risk factors for being vulnerable to the
influence of contingencies of acceptance were identified. There was an indication of an
interaction between the presence of risk factors and acceptance contingency condition.
Specifically, individuals classified as at high risk of susceptibility to acceptance contingencies
(but not those at low risk) reported considerably more anxiety in competence acceptance
contingency condition compared to intrinsic acceptance contingency condition (d = 0.77). These
results suggest that perceived potential for failure in the domain of competence may constitute a
threat to one’s level of social acceptance, and that shifting an activated acceptance contingency
to a domain irrelevant to the pursuit of competence may reduce anxiety about a performance
evaluative of one’s competence for people vulnerable to the influence of acceptance
contingencies. However, caution has to be exercised in interpreting the results due to violation of
assumptions of conducted statistical significance tests.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
People have a need to feel valuable to those they care about (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
To reduce or prevent suffering that ensues when this fundamental need is unmet, people tend to
engage in behaviors that restore or increase their relational value (“the degree to which other
people regard their relationships with the individual to be valuable, important, or close”; Leary &
Baumeister, 2000, p. 9). It may take different things to be valued and accepted by different
people in one’s life. Let’s consider a fictitious person, Joanna. Joanna holds different beliefs
about what it takes to be valued and accepted by different people in her life. For example, Joanna
believes that her coworker mainly cares about her job performance. If Joanna performed poorly
at her job, the coworker would value her less. In contrast, Joanna believes that her grandmother
mainly cares about how kind she is to those around her. If Joanna was mean to her friends, her
value as a person in the grandmother’s eyes would decline. When one is reminded of one’s close
others, the contingencies of one’s relational value shift toward the domains on which one
believes that the close others’ acceptance depends (Horberg & Chen, 2010). Accordingly, if
Joanna was reminded of her coworker, her relational value in that moment would become more
contingent on the coworker’s perceived contingencies of acceptance (in this case, work
performance).
By changing what one’s relational value is contingent on, reminders of one’s close others
may change how one’s need for relational value manifests. These changes may include changes
in what constitutes a threat to one’s relational value as well as changes in potential avenues
through which one may increase one’s relational value. For example, poor work performance
might be much more threatening to Joanna after having been reminded of her coworker rather
than her grandmother because poor work performance may decrease Joanna’s relational value
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with respect to the coworker to a much greater extent. If the coworker rather than the
grandmother is on Joanna’s mind, Joanna may also be more inclined to try to improve her job
performance because it holds a greater incentive for her in the form of relational value.
This research examined how situational changes in acceptance contingencies may
influence manifestation of the need for relational value in the context of pursuit of intellectual
competence. Study 1 focused on emotional consequences of the shifts in what constitutes a threat
to relational value that may result from shifts in acceptance contingencies. Specifically, it
examined whether people experience less anxiety in anticipation of a test evaluative of their
intellectual competence after having been reminded of close others whose acceptance does not
depend on intellectual competence (compared to after having been reminded of those whose
acceptance does). Because shifts of acceptance contingencies away from intellectual competence
may reduce potential of poor performance on the test to reduce one’s relational value (and thus
decrease social threat posed by the test), it was predicted that priming close others whose
acceptance does not depend on competence would reduce self-reported anxiety. Study 2 focused
on motivational changes that may accompany shifts in acceptance contingencies. Specifically, it
examined whether people exert greater effort toward improving their intellectual competence (as
operationalized by reading times on articles about intelligence training and how intensive
package for training intelligence participants chose) after having been reminded of a close other
whose acceptance is contingent on competence (or not). Because of potential for greater
incentive in terms of relational value, it was hypothesized that activation of competence
acceptance contingency would enhance effort toward improvement of intellectual competence.
Being reminded of close others may be a commonplace occurrence in people’s mental
lives that may potentially exert large cumulative effects. Because of that, any improvement in
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understanding of how such occurrences may affect satisfaction and pursuit of arguably the most
fundamental human psychological need—the need for relational value—is of considerable
importance. This is especially so as satisfaction of the need for relational value is strongly
associated with well-being (e.g., León & Núñez, 2012), and one’s level of success in the domain
of activated acceptance contingency influences satisfaction of this need by influencing perceived
relational value (Horberg & Chen, 2010). In addition to better understanding mechanisms
through which one’s social environment may affect one’s well-being, the study of acceptance
contingencies also bears implications for the study of human pursuits in all domains which may
potentially become domains of acceptance contingency, or which may be affected if other
domains become domains of acceptance contingency—be it because of changes in the
individuals’ emotions or motivation. Greater understanding of mechanisms of acceptance
contingencies may also be leveraged in future intervention work that targets bases of relational
value or teaches individuals to change them on their own, so as to improve their psychological
well-being. By further elucidating effects of contingencies of acceptance via their situational
manipulation, the present work aimed to contribute toward building knowledge necessary for
these endeavors.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The research tested responsiveness of people’s anxiety (Study 1) and exertion of effort
(Study 2)—two processes relevant to pursuit of intellectual competence—to domains of
activated relationship-specific acceptance contingencies. The rationale for the work was built on
the following assumptions: (1) individuals have a need for relational value and motivation to
enhance it; (2) relational value and its bases are responsive to changes in activation of cognitive
representations of specific individuals; and (3) the bases of relational value can be affected by
the activations of close others at sufficiently fine-grained level (at least at the level of domainspecificity). The purpose of this literature review is to briefly overview support for these
assumptions and discuss how together they may provide insights into how people’s perceptions
of others and themselves in relation to others influence anxiety and effort during pursuit of
intellectual competence (particularly as it pertains to learning in academic context).
Need and Motivation for Relational Value
The first assumption for the present work concerns the human need and motivation for
relational value and is primarily based on theorizing and findings in the tradition of sociometer
theory.
Sociometer theory. According to sociometer theory, the need and motivation for
relational value is intimately tied with the concept of self-esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, &
Downs, 1995). Specifically, sociometer theory posits that self-esteem is an affective index of
relational value, and that this affective index assists with monitoring of one’s past, present, and
future relational evaluation (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary et al., 1995). Because of its
affective nature, self-esteem may motivate restoration, maintenance, and augmentation of
relational value. State self-esteem is assumed to reflect current perception of one’s worth to
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others and trait self-esteem one’s perception of worth to others as reflected over a long period of
time (Leary et al., 1995). Sociometer theorists maintain that self-esteem as an index of relational
value developed because it was favored by evolutionary pressures: it alerted people to changes in
their value to others and motivated them to restore relational value if it were to decline, which
facilitated mating, securing resources from others, and avoidance of interpersonal conflict (Leary
et al., 1995).
It should be noted that relational value reflected by people’s self-esteem depends on
people’s perceptions of their relational value (rather than actual relational value) and that
relational value is theorized to be affected not only by perceptions of its current level but also
perceptions of potential for its future changes (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). The reliance of
relational value on perceptions allows for considerable malleability of relational value even in
the absence of any new information from other individuals.
The proposition of sociometer theory that self-esteem is interpersonally determined is
supported by substantial evidence. Indirectly, sociometer theory is supported by prior research on
what on the surface appears as pursuit of self-esteem but in fact could be interpreted as pursuit of
relational value (for a review, see Leary, 2005). This research has documented a multitude of
ways through which people self-enhance (Leary, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), such as
through dismissal of ability diagnosticity of a task in response to negative feedback and
augmentation of ability diagnosticity of a task in response to positive feedback (Leitner, Jones, &
Hehman, 2013), making excuses for one’s failure or even withdrawing effort to render potential
failure undiagnostic of one’s ability (McCrea & Hirt, 2001), and befriending those who are
worse than oneself in domains reported to be important to the self (Tesser, Campbell, & Smith,
1984). These processes are consistent with sociometer theory because they all steer people
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toward acting in ways that they internally can interpret as leading to being more valuable per
others’ standards (Leary, 2005). There are also many examples of more direct support for
interpersonal determinants of self-esteem, including responsiveness of state self-esteem to
instances of social acceptance and rejection (Leary et al., 1995), overlap in importance of
dimensions on which people’s self-esteem and perceived approval by others depend
(MacDonald, Saltzman, & Leary, 2003), enhanced decreases in self-esteem following failure
after increased salience of a close other who cares about what the failure might implicate
(Horberg & Chen, 2010), or increases in self-esteem following classical conditioning procedure
that taught individuals to associate themselves with accepting faces (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer,
2004).
While some people claim, counter to the sociometer theory, that their self-esteem is not
affected by how others evaluate them, it is likely that these claims are a result of selfpresentation concerns or a lack of self-awareness. Leary et al. (2003) experimentally manipulated
social approval and disapproval and found no interaction between self-reports of the dependence
of self-esteem on social approval and participants’ self-esteem; in fact, those who claimed that
their self-esteem is independent of others’ approval were affected by others’ disapproval to
similar degree as those who claimed their self-esteem depends on others’ approval. Moreover, it
is telling that self-reported contingency of self-esteem on others’ approval is inversely related to
a measure of social desirability while the opposite pattern holds for contingencies such as virtue
and God’s love (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003).
Because people experience considerable deficits in well-being when the level of their
relational value is deficient, it can be said that people have a need for relational value
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). But people may also pursue relational value even when their
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relational value is not deficient, that is, when they are motivated to maintain or establish it rather
than restore it in response to deficiency (Leary & Allen, 2011). Since only deficiency in
relational value is linked to deficits in well-being, it can be assumed that there are differences
between the influence of factors that guide people to act to restore or maintain their relational
value and those that guide them to augment it. Evidence about how people are influenced by
their perceptions of in what they need to succeed in order to be relationally valued can be
inferred from research on contingencies of self-esteem. When examined as relatively stable
individual differences (trait contingencies of self-esteem), contingencies of self-esteem can be
seen as reflection of differences in people’s relatively stable conceptions of what it takes to be
valued in their environment.
Domain-Specific Contingencies of Self-Esteem
Self-worth contingency model. According to the self-worth contingency model (Crocker
& Wolfe, 2001), people’s self-esteem is contingent on different domains and fluctuates more in
response to indices of success or failure in the domains of contingency. For example, state selfesteem of graduate school applicants was shown to fluctuate in response to acceptances and
rejections from graduate programs, and this fluctuation to both acceptances and rejections was
shown to be moderated only by self-reported contingency of self-esteem on academic
competence rather than also other contingencies such as contingency of self-esteem on physical
appearance or virtue (Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen, 2002). In the domain of academics, this
moderation by self-esteem contingency on academics (but not a general level of self-reported
self-esteem contingency) has also been shown on measures of students’ state self-esteem, affect
(which tends to accompany changes in self-esteem), and identification/belonging with major (the
decrease in which may serve as a self-esteem protective measure; Leitner, Jones, & Hehman,
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2013; Major & Schmader, 1998) in response to obtaining better or worse grades than the students
expected (Crocker, Karpinski, Quinn, & Chase, 2003). At the level of trait self-esteem, the model
would predict that those with a history of success in the domains of self-esteem contingency
experience greater self-esteem than those with a history of failure in the domains of contingency.
Intrapersonal vs. interpersonal perspectives. Researchers examining contingencies of
self-worth have traditionally employed an intrapersonal perspective on self-esteem. Intrapersonal
perspectives on self-esteem assume that self-esteem is determined by individual’s own selfevaluations according to one’s own standards. Intrapersonal perspectives on self-esteem can be
traced as far back as James’s (1890) speculation that self-esteem can be understood as a ratio of
one’s own current level of competence to one’s desired level of competence in the domains of
personal importance, with the individual being able to raise self-esteem either by achieving a
higher level of competence or lowering one’s aims for desired competence. In contrast,
interpersonal perspectives on self-esteem—such as sociometer theory—have their origin in
Cooley’s (1902) work on looking-glass self that described the process through which self-feeling
emerges out of appraisal of one’s self-image and imagined others’ reaction to that image (also
termed a reflected appraisal). The intrapersonal conceptualization of self-esteem in self-worth
contingency model can be evidenced in the operationalization of self-esteem contingencies in
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker et al., 2003), which includes “acceptance from
generalized others” as one of the contingency domains rather than an underlying determinant of
all acceptance contingencies; as well as theorizing that classified self-esteem contingency on
academics as a non-interpersonal contingency (Park, Crocker, & Mickelson, 2004).
This is not to say that intrapersonal perspectives on self-esteem embraced by researchers
examining self-esteem contingencies in educational settings are entirely bereft of assumptions
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about social influences on self-esteem. The formation of self-esteem contingencies (in terms of
which domains self-esteem is contingent on, Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; or in terms of whether selfesteem is vs. is not contingent, Moller, Friedman, & Deci, 2006) tends to be attributed by these
researchers to gradual socialization influences as individuals learn (primarily in childhood) the
conditions of obtaining close others’ esteem, love, and acceptance (as discussed, e.g., in Crocker
& Park, 2004).
That individuals’ self-esteem will be differentially responsive to indications of
performance in different domains can be predicted using either perspective but the use of
intrapersonal perspective diminishes the extent to which the domains of self-esteem contingency
and standards used for self-evaluation in these domains are predicted to be influenced or
determined by other people. This has implications for how the relationship between self-esteem
contingencies and other variables is researched. In particular, insufficient consideration of
interpersonal determinants of self-esteem contingencies has led to treatment of self-esteem
contingencies as relatively stable individual differences separated from relational factors that
may mediate or moderate their effects (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007).
Domain-specific contingencies of self-esteem as domain-specific contingencies of
acceptance. The proposition of sociometer theory that self-esteem reflects relational value can
be extended to the proposition that self-esteem is primarily responsive to satisfaction of
standards and contingencies of interpersonal acceptance. If, for example, one believes that one’s
relational value in the close others’ eyes depends on how well one performs academically more
so than on how good one looks, changes in one’s academic performance are going to affect one’s
self-esteem to a greater degree than changes in one’s physical appearance.

9

Findings from several studies show correspondence between trait domain-specific selfesteem contingencies and trait domain-specific acceptance contingencies. First, there are strong
positive correlations between how people rank importance of domains to their self-esteem and to
relational evaluation (vanDellen, Hoy, & Hoyle, 2009). For example, those who rank highly
importance of academics to their self-esteem also rank highly importance of academics to being
accepted by individuals important to them. Further, measured at the level of trait self-esteem,
people’s assessment of the importance of a given domain for gaining the approval of others has
been shown to moderate the effect of people’s self-evaluation of their performance in the given
domain on trait self-esteem for domains of competence, physical attractiveness, material
possessions, and sociability (MacDonald et al. 2003). That is, people who do not deem
themselves academically successful compared to their peers may experience lower self-esteem
when they also believe that academic competence is important to being valued by important
others than when they do not think academic competence matters to important others.
Likewise, since the social environment tends to impose different acceptance
contingencies on people occupying different social roles, membership in social roles moderates
relationship between trait self-esteem and self-evaluations in domains of importance for
acceptance in the social roles. For example, women, people in relationships, and those of East
Asian descent have been found to be more likely than others to have their self-esteem contingent
on possession of communal qualities such as kindness and warmth (Anthony et al., 2007).
The associations between self-esteem and acceptance contingencies can also be
evidenced in higher accessibility of acceptance and rejection words following primes of positive
and negative appearance words in those with self-esteem contingent on appearance (vanDellen et
al., 2009). Moreover, those with self-esteem more contingent on academics have more biased
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memory for events related to academic achievement as well as higher accessibility of words
related to academic achievement following experience of social rejection (vanDellen, Hoy,
Fernandez, & Hoyle, 2011).
Relational Self and Situationally Activated Acceptance Contingencies
The connection between self-esteem contingencies and acceptance contingencies has
been shown even with respect to situationally activated acceptance contingencies, including
relationship-specific acceptance contingencies that are domain-specific (Horberg & Chen, 2010).
This research largely builds on theorizing and findings that have been synthesized under the
broad conceptual umbrella of relational self (“the self in relation to significant others”; Chen,
Boucher, & Tapias, 2006, p. 151).
Relational self. Relational self may be conceived of as a working self-concept (the selfconcept accessible at a given time; Markus & Wurf, 1987) that is constituted of an activated
representation of self out of a repertoire of stored representations of self in relation to a variety of
other people. An individual’s relational selves are assumed to differ in their level of relationship
specificity (for example, the self in relation to one’s best friend Helen, one’s classmates, or
people in general), the level to which they are chronically activated, and the conditions that may
activate them situationally (Chen, Boucher, & Kraus, 2011). The components of relational self
are assumed to be cognitive in nature, and thus subject to the same structural constraints and
governing principles as any other knowledge structure (Higgins, 1996).
Theorizing about the structure of cognitive representations of the interaction patterns
between the self and others and about mechanisms through which these representations may
influence affect, thoughts, and behaviors can be found in research on relational schemas
(Baldwin, 1992, 1997).
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Relational schemas. Baldwin (1992) defined relational schemas as “cognitive structures
representing regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness” (p. 461). According to Baldwin
(1992), the relational schemas include information about the self, others, and sets of scripts that
take a form of if-then expectancies about others’ reactions to one’s behavior that develop based
on experiences of past interactions. The relational schemas are specific to specific people, and
become influential when the representation of the specific people is mentally activated, the
imagined people becoming one’s private audience (Baldwin, 1997). For example, a student may
have a relational schema for interacting with her teacher that includes expectancy that if she
receives a poor grade, her teacher will belittle her. The student may have developed such a
schema based on experienced or observed teacher’s criticism following intellectual performance
or even inferred criticism based on experienced or observed praise following intellectual
performance. Content of relational schemas concerning expectancies about others’ reactions is
hypothesized to underlie patterns of responses in people’s self-esteem (Baldwin, 1997; Baldwin
& Baccus, 2003). For example, the student with the relational schema connecting intellectual
failure with teachers’ rejection may feel her self-esteem decline as she fails an exam (provided
the schema is active) due to expectation of rejection from a valued significant other. Moreover,
the primed person may even change her definition of what constitutes failure in the domain of
acceptance contingency in the first place. For example, in one of the seminal studies on relational
schemas, psychology graduate students were shown to evaluate their research ideas more
negatively following a prime of their department chair known for his high standards than
following a prime of a friendly postdoctoral scholar (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990).
Situationally-activated acceptance contingencies. Acceptance contingencies can be
induced through situational priming of close others. This demonstrates utility of studying
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acceptance contingencies (rather than merely individual differences in levels or domains of selfesteem contingencies). Namely, it helps to account for the process through which activations of
other individuals may dynamically change manifestations of people’s need and motivation to be
valued in ways that are specific to the activated acceptance contingencies.
Domain-specific acceptance contingencies. Published research examining domainspecific acceptance contingencies is extremely limited. To date, only a single study by Horberg
and Chen (2010) has directly examined whether domains of self-esteem contingencies are
relationship-specific attributes that can be changed through activation of distinct private
audiences. In a series of 3 studies, the researchers subliminally primed participants with
representations of their significant others, and then examined changes in their self-esteem
contingencies (Study 1), state self-esteem following a success or failure in a competition domain
(Study 2), and state self-esteem and relationship perceptions in an appearance domain (Study 3).
Activation of representations of significant others shifted the participants’ self-esteem
contingencies in the direction toward the domains in which the participants perceived that their
significant others cared that the participants do well.
Specifically, Horberg and Chen (2010) showed that after being primed with a word
“father” (compared to being primed with a word “mailman”), participants reported that their selfesteem depended more on the domains that they subsequently rated as the central domains in
which their fathers cared that they succeeded; this relationship was moderated by participants’
desired closeness to their fathers, such that only participants who desired closeness to their
fathers came to stake their self-esteem on the fathers’ central domains of acceptance contingency
(Study 1).
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In Study 2, participants who initially indicated that their self-esteem was not very
affected by outperforming others but that their father cared whether they succeeded over other
people reported to a greater extent that their self-esteem depended on succeeding over others
after being primed with the word “father” (again, compared to a word “mailman”) and exhibited
greater changes in self-esteem after succeeding (though strangely not after failing) in the
relationship-relevant domain of competition. In this study, success and failure were manipulated
by provision of items of differing difficulty and comparative feedback on the Remote Associates
Task, which was presented as a measure of “an ability related to verbal competence and
creativity but not necessarily to academic competence”. The lack of observed decrease after
failing might have been explained by participants’ beliefs that relational value from their fathers
could only be increased but not decreased via their performance but such a possibility was not
assessed.
Study 3 examined these effects in the domain of appearance. It showed greater changes in
self-esteem following failure in the domain of physical appearance among participants who were
primed with a name of a close other who cared about their appearance and with whom
participants desired closeness (the failure induction took form of description of a physical feature
participants disliked about themselves). Importantly, the changes in self-esteem in Study 3
appeared to have been due to perceived changes in relational value: after failure, participants in
the control condition (who had been primed with a bogus name-like word) exhibited positive
correlation between desired closeness and current feelings of closeness with the close other but
this correlation disappeared for participants primed with the close other who cared about their
appearance. Thus, the study provided strong support for sociometer theory by indicating that
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people monitor their relational value in relation to outcomes in activated acceptance
contingencies.
Horberg and Chen (2010) also showed that individuals are capable of identifying close
others who are seen as having only one central domain of acceptance contingency. Nearly all
participants at least once assigned the highest rating on the scale (6 or 7 out of 7) of their father’s
domains of acceptance contingency, and 45% of participants assigned this rating to only one
domain of acceptance contingency (out of 14 domains which the participants rated). While the
centrality of one domain of acceptance contingency might be characteristic of only this sample
(undergraduate U.S. college students with majority Asian ethnicity) or a type of a relational
figure (i.e., the participants’ father), this finding provided support for the possibility of guiding
individuals to identify close others based on their central acceptance contingencies and
intentionally activating them as their private audiences to obtain desired domain-targeted effects
of acceptance contingencies. It also suggests the need to examine effects of acceptance
contingencies in a domain-specific fashion rather than as relatively broader clusters of
acceptance contingencies as was done in prior research (described below).
Extrinsic vs. intrinsic acceptance contingencies. Research on situationally-activated
acceptance contingencies has otherwise focused on differentiating between extrinsic and intrinsic
acceptance, or what has been also roughly correspondingly termed contingent and noncontingent
acceptance (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996;
Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001). These distinctions can be traced back to selfdetermination theory and related perspectives, which differentiate between self-esteem based on
living up to standards (contingent self-esteem) and self-esteem based on simply being who one
is, or being “true” to oneself (noncontingent or true self-esteem; Deci & Ryan, 1991). For
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example, Deci and Ryan (1995) defined contingent self-esteem as “feelings about oneself that
result from—indeed, are dependent on—matching some standard of excellence or living up to
some interpersonal or intrapsychic expectations” and true self-esteem as something that is “more
stable, more securely based in a solid sense of self” and that “developed as [one] acted
autonomously within the context of authentic relationships” (p. 32).
Some have argued (e.g., Arndt & Schimel, 2003; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) that
noncontingent self-esteem does not really exist because even acting authentically to oneself can
be understood as a type of self-esteem contingency. The alternative terms—extrinsic vs. intrinsic
self-esteem contingencies—can be seen as capturing this notion while both theoretically and
empirically maintaining hypothesized differences between outcomes associated with these
clusters of contingencies (for example, positive association between psychological well-being
and intrinsic bases of self-esteem, Vonk & Smit, 2012). While this theoretical tradition
conceptualizes intrinsic contingencies as a reflection of psychological well-being or a contributor
to well-being by means of prompting pursuit of goals that fulfill people’s needs, intrinsic
contingencies could also be seen as leading to higher, more resilient relational value due to
greater abstractness of their requirements. Indeed, greater abstractness in construal of self-esteem
contingencies has been shown to lead to greater self-esteem stability (Updegraff, Emanuel, Suh,
& Gallagher, 2010). Accordingly, the tendency to positively self-evaluate on what tends to be
classified as intrinsic contingencies emerges in both people with low and high self-esteem even
though people with low self-esteem otherwise tend to evaluate themselves more critically
(Anthony et al., 2007). Another possibility that has been suggested is that intrinsic bases of selfesteem lead to perception of relational value that is more stable because individuals perceive
these qualities as more stable (Schimel et al., 2001).
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Situational activation of contingent vs. noncontingent acceptance contingencies provide
additional support for responsiveness of self-esteem contingencies to primed relationships. For
example, Baldwin and Sinclair (1996) asked participants to either provide initials of “a person
who tends to be very accepting and nonevaluative of you and simply accepts you for who you
are” (noncontingent acceptance condition) or “a person who tends to be very evaluative of you
and seems to accept you only if you live up to certain standards of performance” (contingent
acceptance condition) and visualize the person (Study 3). Following visualization of the
contingently accepting person, the participants showed decreased reaction times to recognizing
rejection words following failure words on a lexical decision task (compared to participants who
visualized a noncontingently accepting person), suggesting activation of a schema connecting
failure and rejection—a schema otherwise chronically evidenced in people with low trait selfesteem (Study 1; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996).
Research has also indirectly showed how this type of induction of acceptance
contingency can exert motivational effects toward maintenance of relational value. Following
visualization of a contingently accepting other (compared to a noncontingently accepting other),
individuals were more likely to seek social comparison information when they were led to
believe that others performed more poorly on what was presented as a test of social sensitivity
(Study 1; Schimel et al., 2001). Assuming that the individuals’ relational value in the eyes of the
contingently accepting private audience would be responsive to a variety of competence
outcomes, ascertaining one’s superiority to others and avoiding information that might lead to
disconfirmation of one’s competence might be one way of maintaining or augmenting one’s
relational value. Similarly, visualization of a contingently accepting private audience (compared
to a noncontingently accepting private audience) led participants to indicate greater amount of
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externalizing attributions for what they believed to be their upcoming performance on a mental
arithmetic task, thus enabling them to protect their relational value in case they performed poorly
(Study 1; Arndt et al., 2002).
These findings collectively illustrate how people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors tend
to take a form of what it takes to satisfy activated contingencies of relational value.
Relational Value and Pursuit of Competence
As evidenced in the studies reviewed above, people may associate outcomes in a variety
of domains with information about relational value (e.g., Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; vanDellen et
al., 2011, 2009), and relational value can be impacted by outcomes in an activated domain of
acceptance contingency (Horberg & Chen, 2010). Competence (academic, professional, athletic,
and so on) may accordingly be seen as simply another broad domain in which success or failure
may impact relational value and be pursued for the sake of it. More academically successful
individuals may have higher relational value to teachers and peers who value academic
achievement, more professionally successful individuals may have higher relational value to
bosses and coworkers (or even to romantic partners), more skilled conversationalists may have
higher relational value to their friends, and so on. Given the general perceived importance of
competence for maintaining or increasing relational value (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2003),
perceived competence in what is important to those close others with whom one desires
closeness is particularly likely to become a target of pursuit of relational value (Leary & Allen,
2011).
Theorizing and evidence about what pursuit of competence in service of relational value
may look like can be mostly found in research on individual differences in trait self-esteem
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contingencies, which, as reviewed earlier, can be seen as proxy for trait acceptance contingencies
(i.e., summative perceptions of what it takes to be valued by one’s close others).
Research on trait self-esteem contingencies shows that students who report having their
self-esteem contingent on academics experience increases in self-esteem following positive
academic outcomes and decreases in self-esteem following negative academic outcomes
(Crocker, Karpinski, et al., 2003; Crocker et al., 2002). This affective fluctuation may potentiate
conscious motivation to approach emotional highs and avoid emotional lows associated with
success and failure on academics. It could also result in nonconscious facilitation of goal pursuit
by means of association of relationally valued goals with positive affect (Custers & Aarts, 2005).
Accordingly, students who report having their self-esteem contingent on academics also report
spending more time studying (Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). This corresponds to research on
interpersonally activated acceptance contingencies, which shows that people assign greater
importance to extrinsic goals such as financial success after being primed with acceptance based
on extrinsic domains (Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). On the positive side, contingency on the domain
may also produce increased self-efficacy due to people’s self-enhancing tendencies (i.e.,
tendencies to enhance relational value) because self-enhancement may take a form of increased
perceived validity of the task when individuals experiences success (Leitner et al., 2013).
But there is also evidence that having one’s self-esteem contingent on academics can put
people under too much stress and increase their use of undesirable self-defensive strategies.
Indeed, students with self-esteem contingent on academics perform worse on tasks described as
diagnostic of academic ability compared to tasks described as non-diagnostic (Lawrence &
Crocker, 2009); this relationship was shown to be mediated by increased anxiety that the
contingent students experience under ability-diagnostic conditions (Lawrence & Williams,
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2013). Students with self-esteem contingent on academics also report greater amount of
academic problems such as conflicts with teaching assistants or professors, losing interest in
learning, or perceiving that there is never enough time to meet all their obligations (Crocker &
Luhtanen, 2003). As a caveat to such correlational findings, since students who experience
difficulties in the domain of contingency experience more negative affect, it is possible that they
are more likely to notice contingencies of their self-esteem, and thus to report them. Students
whose self-esteem is more contingent on academics further exhibit greater tendencies to selfhandicap. For example, students who held an incremental theory of intelligence and had highly
contingent self-esteem on academics were more likely to choose to listen to performanceimpairing music and to withhold effort on a difficult compared to an easy ability-diagnostic task,
a pattern that was not obtained for students low on self-esteem contingency on academics (Niiya,
Brook, & Crocker, 2010).
This line of research thus indicates that while students with self-esteem contingent on
academics may have extra motivation to do well, their efforts may be offset by self-handicapping
and anxiety. Anxiety may be more likely to be expected under conditions feared to threaten selfesteem (i.e., relational value) because social anxiety is hypothesized to arise from expectation of
making an undesirable social impression and desire to avoid making that impression (Schlenker
& Leary, 1982). The same applies for self-handicapping, which is generally assumed to result
when individuals fear that decrease in relational value is likely unless they set up excuses for the
potential failure. It is therefore possible to presume that the negative effects associated with selfesteem contingencies on academics will manifest predominantly under conditions when decrease
in relational value is perceived as likely.
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Support for this proposition can evidenced in research that examined effects of upward
vs. downward self-esteem contingencies (that is, increase in self-esteem following success vs.
decrease in self-esteem following failure; Vonk & Smit, 2012). This research has shown
downward extrinsic self-esteem contingencies to be negatively predictive of all indicators of
well-being used in the study (such as a measure of positive and negative affect, a measure of
self-compassion, or a measure of personal well-being that included items related to having
purpose in life, positive relationships with others, feelings of autonomy, and so on) but showed
upward extrinsic contingencies to be either unrelated to well-being or only weakly negatively
correlated with it (Vonk & Smit, 2012). The relational analogue to upward and downward selfesteem contingencies would be increase in relational value following success (i.e., upward
acceptance contingency) vs. decrease in relational value following failure (i.e., downward
acceptance contingency). For example, if a student’s grandmother had only an upward
acceptance contingency on academic achievement, the student’s bad grade would have little
impact on his relational value when the grandmother is his private audience but the student might
increase his relational value if he received a good grade. This might make the student relatively
resistant to self-handicapping or anxiety but still give him extra motivation to strive for academic
excellence.
Positive effects of self-esteem contingencies on motivation (even in the presence of
downward acceptance contingencies) may also be expected when one is operating under nonevaluative conditions or works on tasks which are perceived as within one’s control (effortdependent tasks or tasks for which one has sufficiently high self-efficacy).
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Chapter 3: Present Studies
Overview of Present Studies
To summarize, since self-esteem can be seen as an indicator of relational value (Leary et
al., 1995), domains on which self-esteem is contingent can be seen as indicators of domains on
which relational value is contingent. Prior research has showed that subliminally activating
cognitive representations of a close other can shift bases of people’s self-esteem toward domains
perceived to affect their relational value in the eyes’ of the close other (Horberg & Chen, 2010).
This demonstrates that (1) contingencies of self-esteem can also be understood as states that are
responsive to activations of representations of close others, and suggests that (2) correlational
findings between trait self-esteem contingencies and various outcomes of interest might be
caused by need and motivation for relational value (doing what one thinks it tends to take to be
valued by close others in one’s life) rather than strivings for self-esteem per se.
The present studies investigated whether changing bases of relational value via activation
of cognitive representations of a close other may produce effects that correspond to those
observed in the research on trait self-esteem contingencies. Of importance to the present studies,
when self-esteem contingencies have been investigated as a personality trait in prior research,
basing self-esteem on academics has been linked to self-reports of greater anxiety about
intellectual performance (Lawrence & Williams, 2013) and self-reports of increased study time
(Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). Analogously, the present studies investigated whether inducing
contingency of relational value on a domain leads to increased self-reported anxiety about
performance on a task evaluative of one’s performance in that domain (Study 1), and whether it
guides individuals to exert effort toward improving themselves in that domain (Study 2). By
gathering some additional data on perceptions of the activated close others as well as participant
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characteristics that may heighten sensitivity to acceptance contingencies, the present studies also
examined relational factors that may moderate these effects (such as desired closeness to the
close other or perceived potential for loss of relational value given one’s incompetence).
Overview of Methods
Data about participants’ characteristics and their close others who fit a given profile of
acceptance contingency (competence, physical appearance, and intrinsic acceptance
contingency) were gathered in a prescreening survey (Survey 1). Instructions for identifying the
close other were adapted from procedure used by Baldwin and Sinclair (1996) in a way that
captured targeted domain-specificity.
After a delay of several days, participants were invited for a follow-up survey (Survey 2).
Using a between-group experimental design, a visualization of a close other (identified in
advance in the prescreening survey as possessing specified acceptance contingencies) was used
to induce acceptance contingent on either competence, physical appearance, or intrinsic qualities
(i.e., noncontingent acceptance). Following the visualization, self-reported anxiety about taking
an anticipated intelligence test was measured in Study 1, and effort and intention to exert effort
toward improving one’s intelligence were measured in Study 2.
Hypotheses
Hypotheses for the two studies were formulated as follows.
Study 1 (H1). Controlling for baseline trait self-esteem contingency on academics and
gender, those who will visualize a close other whose acceptance is perceived to be contingent on
intelligence will report greater anxiety about upcoming intelligence test than those in the other
visualization conditions (acceptance contingent on physical appearance, intrinsic acceptance).
This relationship will be moderated by desired closeness, such that individuals with higher
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desired closeness will be more affected by the acceptance contingency (i.e., experience greater
anxiety when in a task-relevant acceptance contingency condition).
These results were predicted because activation of the domain of acceptance contingency
that matches the domain of the anticipated evaluative performance may augment the extent to
which the evaluative performance may affect one’s relational value. The hypothesis was based
on multiple sources, including theorizing that test anxiety has origins in social evaluation
(Covington, 2009; Schlenker & Leary, 1982), evidence that social anxiety can be ameliorated by
expectation of being accepted rather than rejected (Baldwin & Main, 2001), or evidence of the
link between self-esteem contingency on academics and anxiety about intellectual performance
(Lawrence & Williams, 2013).
Prior research (e.g., Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Schimel, Arndt,
Banko, & Cook, 2004; Vonk & Smit, 2012) has frequently operated under the assumption that
any form of acceptance besides acceptance for “who one truly is” (i.e., acceptance based on
intrinsic qualities) undermines the feeling that one’s level of being accepted is stable, and that
this feeling of instability potentiates negative affect, or potentiates defensiveness to reduce the
negative affect whenever one is in evaluative situation. In contrast, the present work assumed
that these effects are primarily linked to specific situations that may result in changes to
relational value. For example, a person may believe that her mother’s acceptance of her is based
solely on her career success and that her husband’s acceptance is based on how good she looks
but not on her career success. If the primary difference is in perception of whether one’s
acceptance is stable, the woman after seeing a picture of a supermodel might be predicted to be
similarly anxious about looking into a mirror when she thinks about her mother as when she
thinks about her husband because her mother’s acceptance is potentially unstable. However, if
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the primary difference is in anticipation of changes in relational value with respect to evaluative
situations within the domain of acceptance contingency, thinking about her mother might not
have the same effect on the woman’s anxiety as would thinking about her husband. Since the
present studies assumed the latter (i.e., effects of contingent valuing are domain-specific), the
hypothesis stated that both activation of acceptance contingent on intrinsic qualities and physical
appearance (i.e., task-irrelevant domain) would lead to less anxiety than activation of acceptance
based on intellectual competence (task-relevant domain).
A threat to the design involving imagining of a close other with contingent valuing of the
subject is the subject’s desire for closeness with the imagined other. As in past studies using
primes of other individuals (e.g., Horberg & Chen, 2010), there was hypothesized to be an
interaction between visualized acceptance contingency condition and desired closeness with the
visualized individual, with greater closeness leading to greater anxiety about being evaluated by
the close other whose acceptance is contingent on intellectual competence.
Because anxiety was measured only with self-reports, it was not possible to rule out the
possibility that the self-reports reflected claimed self-handicapping (in this case, claiming anxiety
in order to render performance on the evaluative task less diagnostic; Smith, Snyder, &
Handelsman, 1982) rather than anxiety. If the self-reports reflected claimed self-handicapping,
Study 1 could be partially seen as an attempt at conceptually replicating Arndt et al.’s (2002)
finding that visualizing contingently accepting close other (compared to noncontingently
accepting one) increases externalizing attributions for performance on an anticipated mental
arithmetic task (externalizing attributions can be seen as another form of claimed selfhandicapping). Regardless of whether self-reported anxiety reflected claimed self-handicapping,
the direction of the hypothesized results would remain the same in as much as the desire to
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protect one’s relational value in the close other’s eyes and uncertainty about being able to do so
might give rise to both increased self-handicapping and anxiety.
Study 2 (H2). Controlling for reading speed, people will exert more effort and will report
intention to exert more effort toward improving their intelligence after visualizing a close other
whose acceptance is perceived to be contingent on intellectual competence. This relationship will
be moderated by desired closeness, such that individuals with higher desired closeness will be
more affected by the acceptance contingency (i.e., exert greater effort when in a task-relevant
acceptance contingency condition).
The hypothesis built on support from many sources, including findings of greater selfreported study time among students with self-esteem more contingent on academics (Crocker,
Luhtanen, et al., 2003), evidence of using competence pursuit as a way of increasing belonging
(Jamieson, Harkins, & Williams, 2010) and enacting achievement goals for social means (Urdan
& Mestas, 2006), or theorizing that links pursuit of relational value to a variety of thoughts and
behaviors that appear to be enacted in its service (e.g., Covington, 2009; Leary & Baumeister,
2000).
While under certain circumstances tasks linked with one’s intelligence might result in
defensive withdrawal of effort, this study was designed to avoid such inferred linkages by the
subjects: a task involving reading about possibilities for improving one’s intelligence with no
evaluative component should diminish performance concerns and the corresponding tendency to
withdraw effort. It was also deemed a suitable task for improving one’s relational value in the
domain of intellectual competence for both people who perceive that their close other’s
acceptance is contingent on intellectual ability per se, and those who perceive that it is contingent
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on one’s level of intellectual competence (which may be enhanced by improved intellectual
ability).

27

Chapter 4: Methods
Both studies consisted of two surveys separated in administration by at least five days.
Survey 1 served for gathering information about participants and their close others. At the
beginning of Survey 2, participants were primed with a randomly assigned close other (one
whose acceptance was perceived as intrinsic vs. contingent on appearance vs. contingent on
competence) by means of a visualization exercise. In Study 1, participants’ anxiety about an
intelligence test was subsequently measured; in study 2, participants’ effort toward improving
their intelligence was subsequently measured. Figure 1 displays a simplified schema of this
between-group experimental design.

Figure 1. Schema of the experimental design for Study 1 and Study 2
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Study 1: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety
Participants. Members of the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce participated
in the study by completing online surveys (Survey 1, Survey 2) in exchange for monetary
compensation. Participants received $2.25 for completion of Survey 1, and $1.10 for completion
of Survey 2. Similar to other studies using MTurk (e.g., Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016),
participation was limited to individuals located in the U.S. who completed more than 100
assignments on the Mechanical Turk in the past and have been approved by requesters in over
90% of cases (these qualifications are based on data maintained about the workers by MTurk).
Minimum sample size of 179 was determined based on power calculation for contrasting
3 groups with desired power of .80 and anticipated effect of F = 0.25 using G*Power (Faul et al.,
2007) software. To protect against unexpectedly high attrition and insufficient number of
participants passing screening criteria in Survey 1, 291 participants were assigned for Survey 1
for this study (Survey 1 data collection was joint for Study 1 and Study 2; the total number of
recruited participants for Survey 1 for both studies was 661; 543 participants passed screening
criteria for eligibility for invitation for Survey 2; of the 543 participants, a randomly selected
subset of 291 was assigned for Study 1, and the rest, 252, for Study 2—more participants were
recruited for Study 1 than Study 2 because of lower costs of Survey 2). Because it was assumed
that attrition would be overestimated yet budgetary constraints precluded inclusion of all eligible
participants who completed Survey 1 and might wish to participate in Survey 2, a stopping rule
for Survey 2 data collection was determined in advance of the start of Survey 2 at 221
participants (preregistered at osf.io/93kfx; note that actual number of collected responses was
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222, probably because one of the participants completed the survey but did not submit it on
MTurk, so he or she was included in the downloaded survey responses).
Participants were excluded from receiving invitation for Survey 2 for any of the
following reasons: inability to identify three unique individuals for the profiles of acceptance
contingencies (for example, reusing a single name multiple times or writing “NA” or “myself),
use of nonsense words or strings of letters for provided reasoning for selecting close others for
given profiles of acceptance contingencies, failure to pass second attention check (the first
attention check was not used at it appeared that participants might have had troubles
understanding it), suspicion of a single person using different worker accounts (use of the same
names of close others in the survey in conjunction with accessing the survey at about the same
time), failure to reclassify identified closes others for the same description of acceptance
contingency at the beginning and end of the survey. Application of these criteria screened out
18% of participants from eligibility for Survey 2.
Survey 2 participants were excluded from analyses if they did not answer affirmatively
that they recognized the name of the close other they were asked to visualize in Survey 2 or if
they did not recall what type of a test they were told they would take (i.e., an intelligence test).
As only participants who passed these two checks were used for analyses (as per preregistered
order of prioritization of checks, osf.io/93kfx), sample characteristics are subsequently provided
only for these participants (N = 194).
Participants who classified themselves as females composed 57.7% of the sample. In
terms of ethnicity, 79.4% of the participants classified themselves as White, 10.8% as Black or
African American, 5.7% as Asian, and 0.5% as American Indian or Alaska Native. In terms of
age, 41.2% participants reported being 18-34 years old, 42.7% being 35-54 years old, and 15.4%
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being 55-74 years old. Participants reported being employed full-time in 56.2% of cases, being
employed part-time in 16.5% of cases, and being a student in 5.2% of cases. Nearly all
participants claimed native English fluency (96.4% of participants). Participants reported having
a college degree in 40.7% of cases, and having completed some postgraduate work or degree in
20.1% of cases.
Procedure. The study consisted of two surveys, a prescreening survey (Survey 1) and a
survey with the manipulation of acceptance contingency and measure of anxiety (Survey 2).
Administration of the surveys was separated by 5-11 days (depending on how soon from the
posting of the surveys participants answered each of the surveys). After giving their consent,
participants read that survey examines connections between personality and characteristics of
social environment, and that they may be later offered a chance for a follow-up. In the survey,
participants first responded to questions related to their trait contingency of self-esteem on
academics, their self-evaluation of competence and appearance, as well as one-item question
about their need to belong (additional filler questions and one attention check were inserted).
Then they identified one of their close others for each of three given profiles of acceptance
contingencies (physical appearance acceptance contingency, competence acceptance
contingency, intrinsic contingency) and provided justification for their selection. After
identification of their close others, participants answered a series of questions about each of the
identified close others (the extent to which their acceptance is intrinsic, contingent on physical
appearance, and contingent on competence; desired closeness to the close others; frequency of
thinking about the close others; etc.; one attention check was included among these questions).
Finally, participants answered a few demographic questions about themselves and completed a
task that asked them to assign the names of the close others they provided earlier in the survey
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again to the given descriptions of acceptance contingencies. The survey ended with thanking for
participation and a survey code for obtaining monetary reimbursement.
After a minimum of 5 days, participants who satisfied selection criteria based on the data
in the prescreening survey received an email that they qualified to take part in another paid task
on MTurk. To prioritize participation by individuals who were able to identify close others who
were a good fit for the target criteria, participants who answered that the close other identified
for competence acceptance contingency evaluates them to a greater extent based on competence
than the close other identified for appearance acceptance contingency does received the email
several hours in advance of the other participants (because of how the survey was set up though,
all eligible participants had access to the survey once it was released, i.e., a few minutes before
the first batch of participants received the email). The email stated that they qualified to complete
a follow-up survey to the survey that they already completed, and another unrelated survey. A
hyperlink was given to the survey with a description that it combines the two unrelated surveys
for which the participants qualified.
The introduction to the survey 2 reiterated that participants would take part in two
ostensibly unrelated studies and mentioned that the first study concerns people’s visualization
ability and the second development of a new measure of intellectual aptitude. The introduction
was followed by a bogus task that included visualization of an animal and a task designed to
activate representations of close others modeled on visualization tasks used in prior studies (e.g.,
Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). The visualization task corresponded to one of three conditions into
which participants were randomly assigned: competence (visualization of Competence
Acceptor), physical appearance (visualization of Appearance Acceptor), or intrinsic acceptance
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contingency (visualization of Intrinsic Acceptor). Then, participants read that they completed the
first study and are now about to answer questions for the second study.
The ostensible “second study” was introduced as testing reliability of a few new items for
a short well-established test designed to measure intelligence in adults. The well-established test
was presented as a significant predictor of one’s intellectual achievements (in academic and
professional settings) as well as one’s ability to reason logically in everyday situations.
Participants also read that feedback would be provided after they complete the test but that first
they needed to answer a few questions about themselves and how they feel about taking the test.
After these instructions, participants completed measures for anxiety and state selfesteem. Then, they were invited to guess what they think the study investigated and respond to a
few checks for their responses. At the end, participants were informed that no actual intelligence
testing would take place and were debriefed about the purpose of the study (that it assessed
anxiety about an anticipated intelligence test following visualization of a close other who did vs.
did not care about one’s competence), thanked for their participation, and awarded a survey code
to receive monetary reimbursement.
Materials (survey 1).
Trait contingency of self-esteem on intellectual competence. Participants responded to
an adaptation of a five-item academic competence subscale of Contingencies of Self-Worth
Scale (Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). This measure (α = .81) served to control for potential
differences in the level of trait self-esteem contingency between experimental groups.
Sample original items: “I feel better about myself when I know I’m doing well
academically”; “My opinion about myself isn’t tied to how well I do in school” (reverse scored).
Two of the items refer to whether participants agree that their self-esteem depends on academic
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performance; two items refer to whether their self-esteem goes up when they do well
academically, and one item refers to whether their self-esteem goes down when they do poorly
academically. Participants rate their agreement with the statements on a 7-point scale (1 =
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree). This measure has been shown to have an
acceptable level of reliability for the timespan within which it is used in the present study (testretest correlation of .74 after 3 months; Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). The predictive validity
of the measure can be evidenced by its ability to predict changes in self-esteem in response to
academic outcomes (e.g., Crocker, Karpinski, et al., 2003).
The instructions for responding to the items stated that if individuals have not
experienced the described situation, they should answer how they think they would feel if it
occurred (Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). This should have made it possible to answer the items
for individuals who were not students.
Self-evaluation of competence and appearance. Participants indicated agreement with
four items for perceived competence (e.g., “I am competent”; α = .90) and four items for
perceived appearance (e.g., “My facial features are attractive”; α = .80) on a 7-point scale: 1 =
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree (Lemay & Clark, 2008).
Need to belong. Need to belong was assessed with a single item “I have a strong need to
belong” (this item showed good validity and test-rest reliability in prior research, Nichols &
Webster, 2013). Participants indicated their agreement with the statement on a 7-point scale: 1 =
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree.
Attention check 1. Participants’ attention to instructions was evaluated based on selection
of Strongly agree in response to “I focus. Pick strongly agree for this item.”
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Filler items. Five additional questions about personality traits were included to disguise
the purpose of the research. For example, participants were asked to indicate agreement on a 7point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree) with items such as “I see
myself as open to new experiences and complex” (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).
Identification of close others matching target profiles of acceptance contingencies.
Participants were then instructed to think about people who are close or important to them and
whom they think about frequently. In order to identify individuals who would be used as primes
of acceptance contingencies in Survey 2, the participants were next instructed to pick one unique
individual who would be the best match for each provided description (i.e., descriptions of
acceptance contingencies). To protect participants’ identity, participants were instructed to use
the people’s first names (with the initial for the last name if necessary; e.g., Jane L.), nicknames
(e.g., mom), or initials (e.g., JL).
The description for the appearance acceptance contingency stated, “This person tends to
mainly evaluate me based on my physical appearance (for example, how good my face or my
body looks) and the extent to which I live up to his or her standards of physical appearance
greatly influences how much he or she likes me.” The description for competence acceptance
contingency stated, “This person tends to mainly evaluate me based on my competence (for
example, based on how smart I am or how good I am at work or school) and the extent to which I
live up to his or her standards of competence greatly influences how much he or she likes me.”
And, finally, the description for intrinsic acceptance contingency stated, “This person tends to be
accepting and nonevaluative of me and simply likes me for who I am.”
These descriptions were modeled based on descriptions used in prior research that
manipulated contingent (~extrinsic) vs. noncontingent (~intrinsic) acceptance contingencies and
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successfully obtained outcomes theorized to correspond to the contingencies following
visualization of close others identified based on the descriptions (e.g., Baldwin & Holmes, 1987;
Schimel et al., 2001; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). The descriptions used in the prior research were:
“a person who clearly likes you, tends to be evaluative of you, and seems to accept you only to
the extent that you live up to certain standards of performance” for contingent acceptance, and “a
person who clearly likes you, tends to be very accepting and non-evaluative of you, and simply
accepts you for who you are” for noncontingent acceptance (note: the descriptor “who clearly
likes you” has been added only in Arndt et al., 2002).
For each given description of acceptance contingency, participants were instructed to
provide justification for why they selected the particular close other.
Relational perceptions. Once participants identified the three close others, they answered
a series of questions about the close others. These questions were designed to be used mainly for
exploratory purposes to see whether they interact with the visualization condition on the main
dependent variables because, for example, Horberg and Chen (2010), showed interaction
between primed close other and desired closeness on shifting participants’ self-esteem
contingency toward the close other’s central domain. These questions were also included to
assist with evaluation of potential alternative explanations for findings.
Fit of the close other for target acceptance contingencies. The fit of the identified close
others for the target acceptance contingency and potential contamination with non-target
acceptance contingency for each of the close others were evaluated with question items as
follows. Participants indicated their agreement that their close other “tends to be very evaluative
of [their, i.e., participants’] physical appearance,” “tends to be very evaluative of [their]
competence (for example, of how smart [they are] or how good [they are] at work or school,”
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and “clearly accepts [them] just for who [they are].” The ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1
= Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree).
Type of relationship to the close other. Participants were asked to classify the type of
relationship they have to each of the individuals they selected: “How would you describe [name
of the identified close other]'s current relationship to you?” The response options included:
Acquaintance (not school- or career-related), Friend (not related to school or your career),
Romantic partner, Family member (not a romantic partner), Professional relationship (for
example, a colleague or a supervisor), School-related relationship (for example, a classmate or
a teacher), Other (specify).
Index of desired closeness to the close other. Desired closeness to each of the close other
was assessed with three items (α = .92 for Intrinsic Acceptor; α = .94 for Appearance Acceptor; α
= .88 for Competence Acceptor); the answers to the items were averaged to obtain the index.
Participants answered the question “How close do you WANT to be to [name of the selected
close other]?” using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all close, 5 = Moderately close; 7 = Extremely
close); the question, “How important is it for you feel valued by [name of the selected close
other]?” using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all important, 5 = Moderately important, 7 = Extremely
important); and question “How valued do you WANT to be by [name of the selected close
other]?” using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all valued, 5 = Moderately valued, 7 = Extremely
valued).
Frequency of thinking about the close other. Participants were asked: “On average, how
often did you think about [name of the selected close other] over the last 30 days?” The response
options were as follows: 1 = Never, 2 = Less than once a week, 3 = Once a week, 4 = 4-6 times a
week, 5 = Daily.
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The close other’s evaluation of the participant’s intelligence and appearance. Two
questions assessed whether the close other considers the participants unintelligent (reversescored) and intelligent (α = .79 for Intrinsic Acceptor; α = .85 for Appearance Acceptor; α = .84
for Competence Acceptor), and not good looking (reverse-scores) and good looking (Lemay &
Clark, 2008). Participants indicated agreement with the statements on a 7-point scale (1 =
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree).
Upward and downward acceptance contingencies. Participants indicated how they
believed their relationship with each of the three close others (i.e., those selected as matching the
descriptions of acceptance contingencies) would be affected if they suddenly improved in each
of the targeted domains of acceptance contingencies (i.e., perceived upward acceptance
contingency in the domain) and if they suddenly became worse (i.e., perceived downward
acceptance contingency in the domain). That is, they answered a total of 18 questions about
acceptance contingencies (two questions per three domains per three close others).
Specifically, to measure upward acceptance contingency on intellectual competence,
participants were asked: “Imagine that by magic you suddenly became much more intelligent,
competent, talented, or skilled than you currently are. How would it influence how much [name
of the selected individual] values you as a person?” The words “became much more intelligent,
competent, talented, or skilled” (the phrase “intelligent, competent, talented, and skilled” was
used to measure competence acceptance contingency in MacDonald et al., 2003) were replaced
with “became much more good-looking” for measuring upward contingency on appearance and
by “started to act much more true to yourself” for measuring upward intrinsic contingency. For
downward acceptance contingencies, the word “more” were replaced with “less” (e.g., “became
much less intelligent, competent, talented or skilled”). Participants answered the items about the
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changes in relational value on a 7-point scale (1 = Would value me much less, 4 = Would value
me still the same, 7 = Would value me much more). The measure of downward acceptance
contingency was reverse scored.
Attention check 2. Participants’ attention to instructions was evaluated based on selection
of Strongly agree in response to “I focus. Pick strongly agree for this item.”
Re-matching the identified close others to their assigned acceptance contingencies. To
ensure that participants selected close others who they would reliably recognize as matching the
acceptance contingency for which the participants identified them, participants were again
presented with each of the descriptions of acceptance contingencies. For each of the descriptions,
the names of the three identified close others were displayed, and participants were asked to pick
which of the close others fits the description best.
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their gender, age, ethnicity,
educational level, employment status, and English proficiency using several listed options. For
ethnicity and employment status, participants were able to endorse multiple options. Option to
decline to answer the question was provided for each of the questions.
Materials (survey 2).
Visualization task 1 (cover story). To reinforce the cover story that the first part of the
survey examined visualization, participants were first instructed to spend 15 seconds imagining
an exotic animal and how they are feeding it. Then, they answered several questions about the
visualization (which animal they visualized, which food they fed the animal, how vivid their
visualization was, etc.)
Visualization task 2 (activation of acceptance contingencies). To make the second
visualization task used for experimental manipulation of acceptance contingencies fit within the
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cover story of the first part of the survey, the task was framed to participants as involving
visualization of something from their life that they are more familiar with (making it seem as if
the familiarity dimension of the object to be visualized was of interest to the study). The
participants were informed that they listed a name of a close other in one of past surveys they
took, and that they would be asked to visualize this person for this exercise.
Participants were randomly assigned into one of the three conditions of acceptance
contingencies (i.e., competence, appearance, or intrinsic contingency). The close other’s name
from Survey 1 corresponding to the acceptance contingency condition to which participants were
assigned was then used as a basis for the visualization. The visualization served the purpose of
activating cognitive representations of the close other (and his or her acceptance contingencies).
While this approach slightly differed from some prior research in which people were asked to
visualize a person identified based on the description of acceptance contingencies within the
same study session (e.g., Sheldon & Kasser, 2008)—which might have resulted in more direct
manipulation of acceptance contingencies—, merely asking people to think of the close others
(without direct mention of acceptance contingencies in close temporal proximity to measurement
of dependent variables) might have been a more ecologically valid way of assessing effects of
daily thoughts about close others and cues that might remind people of them.
The visualization approximated procedure originally developed by Baldwin and Holmes
(1987). For example, participants were asked to focus attention on the person, picture his or her
face, and imagine hearing his or her voice. Then they were asked several questions regarding the
visualization (e.g., rating vividness of the visualization, describing the voice of the close other
they imagined in the visualization, indicating the close other’s hair color) whose purpose was to
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reinforce the cover story about examining visualization and further activate mental
representation of the close other.
Anxiety. Using a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Strongly agree), participants
responded to two items: “I feel anxious about taking this test” and “I feel distressed and uneasy
about taking this test” (α = .89; Lawrence & Williams, 2013; originally adapted from Sarason,
1984). This measure was selected in this study because it was used in prior research to show that
anxiety mediates the association between self-esteem contingencies on academics and worsened
performance under ability-diagnostic conditions (Lawrence & Williams, 2013).
Filler items. As in Survey 1, participants answered several filler personality questions to
conceal the purpose of the questions.
State self-esteem. Two measures of state self-esteem were used: Self-Liking subscale of
Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale-Revised Version (α = .95; SLCS-R; Tafarodi & Swann,
2001) adapted for measurement as a state, and a measure of self-evaluative emotions (α = .77;
Arndt et al., 2002; Leary et al., 1995). While the measures were slightly different from those
used by Horberg and Chen (2010), the choice of two measures for state self-esteem followed the
same rationale—that self-evaluative emotions may be more contextually sensitive. State selfesteem was measured to see whether participants in intellectual competence contingency
experienced lower self-esteem than participants in other conditions (assuming that individuals
have a tendency to doubt their intelligence when facing an intellectual assessment, their selfesteem might decrease more following activation of acceptance contingent on intellectual
competence; similarly, following activation of this type of acceptance contingency, participants
in Study 2 might experience greater increase in their self-esteem after working to improve their
intelligence).
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SLCS-R is a measure developed to better capture the two factor nature of the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)—that is, to differentiate between items that capture one’s
perception of competence (corresponding to Self-Competence subscale in SLCS-R) and those
that capture one’s perception of being loveable (corresponding to Self-Liking subscale in SLCSR; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). Prior research has supported reliability and validity of the measure
(e.g., Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). The Self-Liking subscale was selected because it is theorized
(Tafarodi & Swann, 1995) to be more closely tied to perception of being socially accepted than
the Self-Competence subscale (for a discussion of how common measures of self-esteem may
not cleanly assess self-esteem, see also Leary & Baumeister, 2000). The Self-Liking subscale
includes eight items. Sample items include “I am very comfortable with myself” and “I do not
have enough respect for myself” (reverse scored). Participants rate their answers on a 5-point
scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). To convert the measure into measuring state
self-esteem, participants were asked to respond to items with respect to how they feel “right
now” and adverbs like “never” (which refer to the past feelings) were not used. Asking people to
make judgments about items measuring self-esteem with respect to “right now” is a common
practice in measurement of state self-esteem (e.g., Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
Self-evaluative emotions were measured by asking participants to rate how they feel right
now using a 7-point scale with the following adjectives (summed into an index of self-evaluative
emotions): good–bad, proud–ashamed, valuable–worthless, and loved–unloved (as in Leary et
al., 1995, with a switch from happy–dejected to loved–unloved as in Arndt et al., 2002). As
evidence of validity of these feelings in terms of their reflection of being valued, rankings of how
approvingly others would react to various outcomes have been shown to correlate with the index
(Leary et al., 1995).
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Attention check. Participants’ attention to instructions was evaluated based on selection
of Somewhat agree in response to “I read instructions. Select somewhat agree for this item.”
Hypothesis guessing. Participants were asked to type if based on the questions they had
completed so far they had any guesses about what the study investigated, and if so, to state what
those guesses were.
Careful reading of questions. Participants responded to a question, “How carefully have
you read all the instructions and questions in this survey so far?” Five options were provided: 1 =
Not at all carefully, 3 = Moderately carefully, 5 = Extremely carefully. Participants were asked to
answer the question honestly (it was emphasized that their compensation does not depend on the
answer to the question).
Number of breaks taken. Participants were asked, “How much time in total did you
spend taking a break (for example, to answer a phone call or read an email) while completing the
study?” They selected from the following options: 0 minutes, 1-5 minutes, 10-20 minutes, 20
minutes or more.
Manipulation checks. As manipulation checks, participants were asked to select among
several options to see whether they could recall the type of test they were told they would take
(i.e., test of intelligence) and type the name of the close other they were asked to visualize.
Re-matching the identified close others to their assigned acceptance contingencies. To
check whether the visualized close other would still be classified as fitting the acceptance
contingency it was assumed to represent, participants were again presented with each of the
descriptions of acceptance contingencies and asked to select the name of the close other (out of
the three names they provided in Survey 1) who best fits each of the descriptions.
Study 2: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort

43

Participants. Participants were selected for Survey 2 in Study 2 the same way they were
selected in Study 1. Identical considerations were applied for determining minimum sample size.
The data collection for Study 2 was stopped at 189 participants. Because application of the first
exclusion criterion (confirmation of having recognized the name of the close other in the
visualization task) already dropped the number of participants beyond the minimum sample size
that was calculated, no other exclusion criteria were applied. The subsequent sample
characteristics are provided only for these participants (N = 173).
Participants who classified themselves as females composed 54.3% of the sample. In
terms of ethnicity, 80.9% of the participants classified themselves as White, 9.2% as Black or
African American, 5.8% as Asian, and 2.3% as American Indian or Alaska Native. In terms of
age, 43.4% participants reported being 18-34 years old, 42.7% being 35-54 years old, and 13.9%
being 55-74 years old. Participants reported being employed full-time in 61.8% of cases, being
employed part-time in 16.2% of cases, and being a student in 3.5% of cases. Nearly all
participants claimed native English fluency (97.1% of participants). Participants reported having
a college degree in 40.5% of cases, and having completed some postgraduate work or degree in
14.5% of cases.
Procedure. The second study consisted of two surveys whose administration was
separated by 5-11 days. The first survey was identical to the survey 1 in Study 1. The same
procedure as in Study 1 was used for contacting participants to take the second survey. In the
second survey, participants underwent the same visualization tasks aimed at activating
acceptance contingencies as in Study 1 according to one of the three acceptance contingency
conditions into which they were randomly assigned. The visualization tasks were followed by
introduction to the second part of the survey for the ostensibly separate study.
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The second part of the survey was presented as a study that examined suitability of
background reading materials for an intelligence training program. Participants were told that
they would be asked to provide their impressions of the materials and answer a few questions
about themselves. Then, they had a chance to read the materials. After reading the first article on
the possibility of growing their intelligence, participants answered several questions about their
perceptions of the article (these questions served primarily for reinforcement of the cover story).
Afterwards, participants were asked whether they would like to receive by email free access to
materials with exercises for training intelligence (and if yes, how extensive a training package
they would prefer). The choice of the package served as a measure of intentions to exert effort
toward improving intelligence. After they made a selection, participants were also told that on
the next page they would have an opportunity to read and subsequently evaluate one additional
reading but that once the page loads, they can skip the reading and evaluating if they wish. The
reading times on the articles were used as measures of effort. Participants were also asked to read
one more article about an irrelevant topic (coral reefs), which were to serve as a covariate for
reading speed.
After participants completed the readings, they responded to measures of state selfesteem. Finally, as in Study 1, participants answered questions about how carefully they read
instructions, how much time they spent taking a break, and what type of training program the
instructions stated that the readings were intended for. They also typed the name of the close
other they were asked to visualize at the beginning of the survey and then matched the close
others from Survey 1 again to their contingencies of acceptance. Debriefing about the purpose of
the study and a survey code to receive monetary reimbursement followed. Participants received
$2.40 for completion of Survey 2.
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Materials. Difference in Study 2 from Study 1 is only in a part of the second part of the
second survey. For that reason, only materials that are included in Study 2 but not in Study 1 are
described below.
Readings on intelligence training. The first reading that all participants were asked to
read was adapted from the article “You can grow your intelligence” by Blackwell, Trzesniewski,
and Dweck (2007). This article conveyed a message that intelligence can be increased through
practice the same way that muscles can be strengthened through exercise.
In addition to this article, participants were able to read an optional reading (all
participants accessed the reading but were told they could skip to the next page if they so
wished); this reading described a method for training intelligence and was adapted from the
article “A simple exercise to boost IQ” (Lehrer, 2011).
Reading to assess reading speed. A reading about an unrelated topic, adapted from
“Hawaii’s mysterious coral reefs turn out to be super weird” (Simon, 2016), was used to control
for participants’ reading speed.
Perceptions of the readings. To reinforce the cover story, participants were asked to rate
how credible, worthwhile, and interesting they found the provided readings using single-item
questions with 5-point response scales (1 = Not at all credible/worthwhile/interesting, 5 = Highly
credible/worthwhile/interesting).
Effort. Participants’ time spent reading the articles about intelligence training was
recorded and used as an indicator of effort.
Intentions to exert effort. Participants’ selection of which free intelligence training
package they would like to receive was used as a measure of intentions to exert effort.
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Participants were given five choices: 1 = no package, 2 = package for occasional practice, 3 =
package for frequent practice, and 4 = package for very frequent practice (most effective).
Manipulation checks. The manipulation checks took the same form as the checks in
Study 1 except that instead of asking about what participants were told a test would measure,
they were asked for what type of training the provided readings were intended (i.e., training of
intelligence).
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Chapter 5: Results
This chapter consists of sections for preliminary analyses, confirmatory analyses, and
exploratory analyses. Preliminary analyses include descriptive information relevant to evaluation
of intervention implementation (prime characteristics; information about participants’
responding), evaluation of main measures (correlation of anxiety and effort with self-esteem
contingency on academics), and examination of assumptions for subsequent inferential analyses.
Confirmatory analyses examine effect of acceptance contingency on anxiety (Study 1) and effort
(Study 2). The prediction for the confirmatory analyses was that participants for whom
competence acceptance contingency was activated would report more anxiety and more effort
than participants with other activated acceptance contingencies, and that this relationship would
be moderated by closeness to Competence Acceptor (those closer to Competence Acceptor
would experience more anxiety and exert greater effort). Exploratory analyses in both studies
additionally examine presence of differences among acceptance contingency conditions on
measures of state self-esteem (because it was predicted that under activation of competence
acceptance contingency state self-esteem might be decreased by self-doubts induced by
anticipation of an intelligence test and increased by indication of willingness to improve one’s
intelligence to a greater extent than under activation of other acceptance contingencies). Because
confirmatory analysis in Study 1 suggested presence of moderating factors, exploratory analyses
were also conducted to examine influence of additional potential moderating factors (those that
might theoretically strengthen the influence of prime for competence acceptance contingency or
general sensitivity to social influences).
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Study 1: Preliminary Analyses
The study included a number of checks to evaluate implementation fidelity. While only a
subset of the checks (i.e., self-reported ability to recognize the visualized person; recall of being
asked to take a test of one’s intelligence) deemed the most important was used for exclusion of
participants from the analyses in order not to excessively limit sample size, descriptive
information about the checks is provided for evaluation purposes. There were 28 participants
(12.6% of all survey 2 participants) who did not pass the check of recognition of the visualized
person or of recall of the purpose of the anticipated test; these participants were excluded from
all analyses (leaving a sample of 194 participants available for analyses).
Perceived characteristics of the identified close others. In order for the primes of close
others to activate intended acceptance contingencies, it is assumed that the close others should fit
the intended profile of acceptance contingencies. That is, at minimum, Competence Acceptor
should be perceived as more evaluative of competence than Intrinsic and Appearance Acceptor,
Appearance Acceptor should be perceived as more evaluative of appearance than Competence
and Intrinsic Acceptors, and Intrinsic Acceptor should be less evaluative of competence and
appearance as well as be perceived as more accepting of one simply for who one is than
Competence and Appearance Acceptors. That said, it is plausible that other conditions may be
necessary (such as a minimum level of the target contingency, or sufficient distinctiveness of the
target contingency in relation to other contingencies for the close other). Information about
acceptance contingencies may be inferred from the perceived close others’ evaluativeness of the
target characteristics. Table 1 displays the means for these items per the identified close other.
The mean values for these characteristics suggest that the minimum requirements were met.
Appearance Acceptors also tended to care more about competence than Competence Acceptors

49

tended to care about appearance. This suggests that Appearance Acceptors might have, on the
whole, been perceived as more contingently accepting. While appearance is only one potential
task-irrelevant domain, somewhat greater disagreement with the statement that Appearance
Acceptor simply accepts one for who one is suggests that this prime was indeed more contingent.
Hence, comparison of the level of anxiety elicited by appearance vs. competence prime should
enable comparison of the effects of greater task-irrelevant contingency with greater level of
contingency in general. However, because of the presence of competence contingency in
appearance prime, it is not possible to tell whether any potential greater anxiety following
appearance prime compared to intrinsic prime is due to greater level of contingency or greater
presence of task-relevant contingency (i.e., competence).

Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the extent to which the identified close others accept one based on
intrinsic qualities, appearance, and competence in Study 1
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes
Acceptance
Contingency

Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Intrinsic Acceptance

6.7

0.67

3.5

1.57

4.3

1.58

Appearance Acceptance

2.2

1.27

6.1

0.82

2.9

1.62

Competence Acceptance

3.0

1.68

4.0

1.71

6.2

0.92

Participants’ justifications for selection of close others for acceptance contingency
descriptions may provide additional information about what may be primed in different
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experimental conditions. Reasons based on which participants made acceptance contingency
inferences were varied. For example, for appearance and competence contingencies, the reasons
included the close other’s high performance in the domain (e.g., “She is smoking hot” for
appearance), fit of the relational role with the participant’s acceptance schema for the role (e.g.,
“He is my boss” for competence), the close other’s comments, praise, or criticism about the
participant’s performance in the domain (e.g., “She compliments me when I have on a really nice
outfit but otherwise says nothing.”), the close other’s evaluation of others or differential
acceptance based on performance in the domain or general evaluative style (e.g., “she bases her
opinion on people by the degrees that they have” for competence), or perceptions of whether
one’s performance in the domain determines acceptance (e.g., “This is my boss, my performance
and competence determines his like or dislike for me” for competence). Reasons for intrinsic
contingency included, for example, kindness, lack of being judgmental, supportiveness, or
unconditional love (e.g., “She is my spouse and no matter what happens she will always support
me”). The provided reasons overall indicated that participants understood descriptions of the
acceptance contingencies and made their selections in accordance with the criteria.
Even if the close others fit the target profile of acceptance contingency, the prime might
not be effective unless participants desire closeness to the close other (as seen in studies
conducted by Horberg & Chen, 2010) or the prime is sufficiently strong as to lead to automatic
activation of acceptance contingency (the strength of the prime may be indexed by reported
frequency of thinking about the close other). The information about potential effectiveness of the
primes is displayed in Table 2. Greater desired closeness and frequency of thinking about the
close other corresponded to lower overall contingency of the prime.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for desired closeness to the identified close others and for frequency of
thinking about them in Study 1
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes
Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

Characteristic

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Desired closeness

4.3

0.81

2.8

1.29

3.2

1.04

Frequency of thinking
about the close other

5.1

1.18

3.8

1.74

3.9

1.54

Of course, any effects due to activation of the identified close others may have been due
to characteristics of close others that correlate with the acceptance contingency and may exert
unexpected effects on the dependent measures. Three such additional characteristics were
included in this study: type of relationship to the close other, the close other’s evaluation of one’s
competence, and the close other’s evaluation of one’s appearance. The information about these
additional characteristics is displayed in Table 3 and Table 4.
This information indicates a potential confound—Intrinsic Acceptor evaluates
participants more highly than Appearance and Competence Acceptors do. Activating
representations of close others has been shown to influence one’s success expectancies in line
with how positive the activated close others are perceived to evaluate the individual (Shah,
2003). If improved self-evaluation resulted in decreased anxiety, participants might experience
less anxiety following prime of Intrinsic Acceptor compared to primes of Appearance and
Competence Acceptors.
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Appearance Acceptors were most likely to be friends, romantic partners, and family
members; Competence Acceptors were most likely to be friends, those with whom one has a
professional relationship, and family members; Intrinsic Acceptors were most likely to be
friends, family members, and romantic partners. Greater percentage of professional relationships
in the competence prime might be problematic as it might prime greater stress that participants
might experience at work, which may influence participants’ level of anxiety.

Table 3
Descriptive statistics for how the identified close others are perceived to evaluate participants’
competence and appearance in Study 1
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes
Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence Acceptor

Characteristic

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Evaluates participant as
competent

6.2

0.78

5.4

1.27

5.7

1.14

Evaluates participant as
good-looking

5.5

1.17

4.7

1.66

4.5

1.14
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Table 4
Identified close others’ relationship to the participants in Study 1
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance
Contingency Primes
Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

Percent

Percent

Percent

Acquaintance (not related to
school or career)

0.0

14.9

1.5

Friend (not related to school
or career)

43.8

32.0

32.0

Romantic partner

25.8

20.6

3.6

Family member (not a
romantic partner)

26.3

17.5

26.8

Professional relationship (for
example, a colleague or a
supervisor)

1.5

6.7

28.9

School-related relationship
(for example, a classmate or
a teacher)

1.0

0.5

5.7

Other

1.5

7.7

1.5

Relationship

Manipulation and attention checks. The attention check was passed by 95.5% of
Survey 2 participants. No breaks taken during the study were reported by 93.2% of participants.
Reading instructions very or extremely carefully was reported by 97.8% of participants. The type
of test (i.e., intelligence test) included in instructions was correctly recalled by 92.3% of
participants (note that several participants reported confusion about this question as they thought
it related to the visualization exercises). Participants confirmed that they recognized the close
other they were instructed to visualize in 94.6% of cases. Participants identically reclassified
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92.8% of close others with competence contingency, 92.8% of close others with appearance
contingency, and 95.5% of close others with intrinsic contingency (these numbers should not be
understood as evidence that participants’ perception of these close others in relation to each other
did not change as it is possible that the participants mistakenly believed that they have to choose
the same description as they did in a previous survey). Participants recalled at the end of the
survey the name of the close other they were asked to visualize in 99.0% percent of cases (two
participants wrote a description of the person rather than a name, so it was not possible to
ascertain their answers). The relatively high rate of correct answers to each of the checks
suggests that participants indeed paid attention to instructions, possessed consistent
representation of the visualized close others, and were cognizant that they are about to take an
intelligence test while answering questions about anxiety and self-esteem.
Hypothesis guessing. Only five individuals expressed opinion that the study examined
connection between visualization of a person and feelings (this does not include individuals who
expressed connection between visualization task in general or visualization ability and feelings).
Attrition. Ten individuals began the survey but did not complete it. Only one of these
individuals left the study at a point that could be relevant to the effect of experimental conditions
(i.e., once or after the name of the randomly assigned close other was displayed); this participant
was in competence contingency condition.
Correlation between baseline self-esteem contingency on academics and anxiety.
There was a moderate positive correlation between average anxiety and average self-worth
contingency on academics, r(192) = .251, p < .001. The covariance suggests that the measure of
anxiety may be sensitive to activation of competence acceptance contingency. This supports the
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use of the measure in the study as it signifies that the measure may be capable of detecting
effects of situationally activated acceptance contingencies.
Distribution of relevant variables. Distributions of the variables used to examine effects
of activated acceptance contingencies on anxiety were examined for normality (see Table 5).
Self-esteem contingency on academics, self-evaluation of competence, and closeness to
Competence Acceptor distributions had a largely negative skew. Threat to relational value from
Competence Acceptor had a largely positive skew (participants tended to perceive that the close
other would value them much less if they became less competent).

Table 5
Descriptive statistics for variables used as covariates in the confirmatory analysis and additional
variables that were used as moderators in exploratory analyses examining effects on anxiety
Variable
M
SD
Skewness
Kurtosis
Self-esteem contingency of academics 5.3
1.03
-0.922
0.597
Self-evaluation of competence
6.1
0.79
-1.446
3.470
Closeness to Competence Acceptor
3.2
1.04
-0.294
-0.452
Frequency of thinking about
3.9
1.53
-0.111
-1.048
Competence Acceptor
Need to belong
3.9
1.66
-0.008
-0.930
Threat to relational value from
2.46
1.179
0.547
0.098
Competence Acceptor (Competence
Acceptor’s downward acceptance
contingencies on competence)
Sum of risk factors
3.3
1.49
-0.058
-0.646
Note. SE for skewness = 0.175; SE for kurtosis = 0.347.

In order to ascertain whether the data is suitable for analyses of variance, the distributions
of anxiety were examined for normality (by acceptance contingency condition and by desired
closeness, see Table 6; and by acceptance contingency and by susceptibility to acceptance
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contingencies, see Table 7). The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality indicated considerable
departures from normality in almost all groups. Homogeneity of variance was also examined.
For grouping of acceptance contingency condition by desired closeness, Levene’s test did not
indicate violation of homogeneity of variance, p = .120; for grouping of acceptance contingency
condition by susceptibility to acceptance contingencies, Levene’s test also did not indicate
violation of homogeneity of variance, p = .076.

Table 6
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of anxiety for acceptance contingency
condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor
Shapiro-Wilk test
Cell
Statistic
p-value
Above-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency
.920
.014
Above-average closeness, Appearance contingency
.917
.020
Above-average closeness, Competence contingency
.915
.014
Below-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency
.931
.047
Below-average closeness, Appearance contingency
.900
.004
Below-average closeness, Competence contingency
.905
.013

Table 7
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of anxiety for acceptance contingency
condition by susceptibility to acceptance contingencies
Shapiro-Wilk test
Cell
Statistic
p-value
High susceptibility, Intrinsic contingency
.925
.025
High susceptibility, Appearance contingency
.931
.093
High susceptibility, Competence contingency
.938
.079
Low susceptibility, Intrinsic contingency
.924
.030
Low susceptibility, Appearance contingency
.891
.001
Low susceptibility, Competence contingency
.895
.006
Visual inspection of the histograms (Figure 2 and 3) indicated several shapes of
distributions for different cells of analyses. Participants below-average in desired closeness to
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Competence Acceptor and those with a small number of identified risks to susceptibility to
acceptance contingencies (i.e., three or fewer) tended to exhibit bimodal distribution of anxiety
in all experimental conditions. In contrast, those with above-average desired closeness or high
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies tended to exhibit flat or slightly positively skewed
distribution of anxiety when in either intrinsic or appearance acceptance contingency conditions,
and negatively skewed distribution in competence acceptance contingency condition.
The negatively skewed distribution in competence acceptance contingency condition
might be construed as a result of the effects of the experimental condition (individuals who
would have otherwise reported little anxiety reported more anxiety because of the visualization
of Competence Acceptor), and thus be an evidence supporting the hypothesis of the study.
Different shapes of the distributions do not enable uniform transformation, and thus
complicate analyses. For the confirmatory analysis that used self-esteem contingency on
academics and gender as covariates, another violation of the assumptions might be heterogeneity
of variances (while self-esteem contingency on academics and gender did not statistically
significantly interact with anxiety, exploratory analyses indicated that women and those aboveaverage on self-esteem contingency on academics might be more sensitive to the effects of
competence acceptance contingency). Despite violations of normality and differences in shapes
of distributions, analyses of variance were conducted anyway (due to the author’s lack of
knowledge of techniques that would be more appropriate). However, because of the multiple
violations of assumptions, caution has to be exercised in interpreting the reported results of the
statistical significance tests and effect sizes.
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Figure 2. Histogram for distribution of anxiety by acceptance contingency condition and by
closeness to Competence Acceptor

Figure 3. Histogram for distribution of anxiety by acceptance contingency condition and by
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies
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Study 1: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety (Confirmatory Analysis).
A 3 (contingency: intrinsic vs. appearance vs. competence) x 2 (desired closeness to
Competence Acceptor: dichotomized at below-average vs. above-average) analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) was conducted to examine whether activating domain-specific acceptance
contingencies influenced participants’ anxiety and whether this relationship was moderated by
desired closeness to Competence Acceptor; self-esteem contingency on academics, selfevaluation of competence, and gender were used as covariates. The effects of condition were
predicted to be moderated by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor because greater desired
closeness might enhance the effectiveness of the prime (loss of relational value in the eyes of
close other with whom one highly desires closeness might be more threatening). Higher baseline
self-esteem contingency on academics (an indicator of how much others in one’s life in general
may evaluate one based on intellectual performance), lower self-evaluation of competence
(lower perceived competence may lead to greater worries about performing poorly), and being a
female were characteristics that were predicted to be associated with higher anxiety, and thus
were chosen as covariates to reduce the error term.
All three covariates were statistically significant predictors of anxiety in the predicted
direction: contingency of self-worth on academics, F(1, 184) = 11.729, MSe = 539.869, p = .001,
ηp2 = .060; self-evaluation of one’s competence, F(1, 184) = 4.034, p = .046, ηp2 = .021; and
gender, F(1, 184) = 7.720, p = .006, ηp2 = .040. The interaction between desired closeness and
contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 184) = .943, p = .391, ηp2 = .010. The
main effect of contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 184) = 1.361, p =
.259, ηp2 = .015. The main effect of closeness was not statistically significant either, F(1, 184) =
0.701, p = .404, ηp2 = .004.
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Nevertheless, the direction of the means was as predicted, with larger differences
between competence contingency and other conditions observed among those who desired
closeness to the close other with perceived competence-contingent acceptance (see Figure 4).
Moreover, the effect sizes for the differences between competence contingency and other
conditions among those above-average in desired closeness were sizeable considering the brief
procedure used to activate the acceptance contingencies: d = 0.54 for difference between
competence and intrinsic contingency, d = 0.46 for difference between competence and
appearance contingency (see Table 8). These results provide initial support for the hypotheses of
this study and substantiate a need for replication of the study with larger, more targeted sample.

Figure 4. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and desired closeness to
Competence Acceptor
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Table 8
Descriptive statistics of average anxiety displayed by dichotomized desired closeness to the close
other with competence-contingent acceptance, and by experimental group
Cohen’s ds for differences between
group means
Factor

n

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

1. Intrinsic contingency

31

3.32

1.60

2. Appearance contingency

35

3.56

1.74

0.14

3. Competence contingency

28

3.48

1.97

0.09 0.04

4. Intrinsic contingency

35

3.50

1.95

0.10 0.03 0.01

5. Appearance contingency

31

3.63

2.02

0.17 0.04 0.07 0.07

6. Competence contingency

33

4.44

1.48

0.72 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.46

6

Desired closeness below-average

Desired closeness above-average

Note. Unadjusted means are displayed.

Study 1: Exploratory Analyses
Examining moderation by theorized individual difference variables of effects of
contingency conditions on anxiety. Given quite large error variance in the whole sample,
means for the experimental conditions were obtained for subgroups of participants based on
individual difference variables hypothesized to influence the strength of the effects (see Table 9
for correlations of membership in these groups). The purpose of these analyses was to identify
whether the activated acceptance contingencies might be differentially effective for different
groups of participants. Evidence that they are may inform selection of participants for the future
replication study.
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Table 9
Correlations among the dichotomized variables used to investigate differential effectiveness of
the experimental conditions
Subgroup classification

1

2

3

4

5

1. Above-average desired closeness to Competence
Accepter

--

2. Above-average frequency of thinking about
Competence Accepter

.42

--

3. Above-average need to belong

.30

.15

4. High threat to relational value

-.04 -.05 -.01

--

5. Above-average self-worth contingencies on academics

.22

.12

.08

.09

--

6. Female

.01

.08

.09

-.01

.01

6

--

--

Frequency of thinking about the close other whose acceptance depends on competence.
The influence of competence contingency prime should theoretically also be strengthened by
higher frequency of thinking about the close other identified for the competence contingency
acceptance profile. Thinking about close others more frequently should lead to greater
consideration of what their acceptance depends on, and thus greater likelihood of automatic
activation of their acceptance contingencies when being reminded of them. A plot of means by
frequency of thinking about the close other identified for competence contingency (aboveaverage vs. below-average) is displayed in Figure 5. There was a trend for larger differences in
anxiety between competence contingency condition and appearance contingency condition as
well as between competence contingency condition and intrinsic contingency condition among
those in the subgroup who reported thinking about the close other more frequently compared to
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the other subgroup; the relative magnitude of the means was also in the predicted direction. This
resulted reflected the trend evidenced in grouping by closeness to the close other. The result of
the analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety when the sample for analysis was
restricted to those above-average in frequency of thinking about Competence Acceptor was as
follows: F(2, 113) = 1.748, MSe = 3.366, p = .179, ηp2 = .030. Among those above-average in
frequency of thinking about Competence Acceptor, the effect sizes were d = 0.43 for difference
between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.31 for difference between competence
and appearance contingency.

Figure 5. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and frequency of
thinking about Competence Acceptor
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Need to belong. Desired closeness to the close other who cares about one’s competence
and frequency of thinking about him or her enable only comparison of the influences of stronger
prime of competence contingency to less strong prime of competence contingency relative to the
primes of appearance and intrinsic contingency that are of whichever strength that happens to
correlate with the desire to be close to someone who cares about one’s competence or thinking
about him or her more frequently. For that reason, the moderation of the influence of conditions
on anxiety was also examined for individuals who were above-average vs. below-average on a
single-item measure of need to belong. Since the need to belong should index one’s
susceptibility to being accepted, susceptibility to the influence of all activated acceptance
contingencies should be higher in individuals who are higher in the need to belong. As seen in
Figure 6, the trend for larger difference between competency contingency and intrinsic
contingency again emerged. In contrast to the groupings that included a group that strengthened
only competence contingency prime, the differences in means between the competence
contingency condition and appearance contingency condition were quite similar. As close others
identified for appearance contingency profile tended to also be perceived as somewhat evaluative
of one’s competence, it is plausible that participants sensitive to social cues reacted to the
presence of the competence contingency in appearance-contingent close others. The result of the
analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety when the sample for the analysis was
restricted to those above-average on need to belong was as follows: F(2, 102) = 1.743, MSe =
3.338, p = .180, ηp2 = .033. Among those above-average in need to belong, the effect sizes were
d = 0.44 for difference between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.15 for
difference between competence and appearance contingency.
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Figure 6. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and need to belong

Threat to relational value. Both desired closeness to the competence person, frequency
of thinking about the competence person, and general susceptibility to social influences should
exacerbate participants’ responsiveness to the activated acceptance contingencies. But in order
for the acceptance contingencies to be influential when one is sensitive to them, participants
should perceive that their value in the close others’ eyes indeed substantially hinges on
performance in the domain of acceptance contingency. For that reason, the influence of activated
contingency was additionally examined for participants for whom failure at the task evaluative of
their competence would result in the highest loss in terms of relational value vs. those for whom
it would have relatively little consequence. The participants with high risk of loss of relational
value were operationalized as those who indicated that the person identified for competence
contingency profile would value them “less” or “much less” if they became much less
competent; those with low risk of loss of relational value as those who indicated “slightly less”,
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“still the same”, or more for the same question. As seen in Figure 7, those at a greater risk for
loss of relational value from the competence person reported higher anxiety when in competence
contingency condition than in either of the appearance or intrinsic contingency conditions; this
trend did not emerge for participants who faced little threat to their relational value from
competence person. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction. When the sample for
analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety was restricted to participants at high
risk of loss of relational value, an effect of experimental condition emerged at a conventionally
statistically significant level, F(2, 103) = 3.416, MSe = 3.125, p = .037, ηp2 = .062. Among those
with high threat to relational value from Competence Acceptor, the effect sizes were d = 0.57 for
difference between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.54 for difference between
competence and appearance contingency.

Figure 7. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and threat to relational
value from Competence Acceptor
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Baseline self-worth contingency on academics. Individuals with higher baseline
contingency of self-worth on academics might be more sensitive to the activation of competence
contingency acceptance. This possibility is consistent with the observed relationships (see Figure
8). This may indicate that those most likely to be at risk for experiencing side effects of
competence contingency may be the ones who are the most sensitive to situational changes in
acceptance contingencies (rather than that the observed relationships are driven by individuals
who are at a relatively low risk but become considerably more anxious once the competence
contingency is activated). The result of the analysis of the effect of experimental condition on
anxiety when the sample for the analysis was restricted to those above-average on self-worth
contingency on academics was as follows: F(2, 108) = 3.017, MSe = 3.152, p = .053, ηp2 = .053.
Among those with above-average contingency of self-worth on academics, the effect sizes were
d = 0.59 for difference between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.40 for
difference between competence and appearance contingency.
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Figure 8. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and contingency of selfworth on academics

Gender. Because women in this study reported more anxiety (M = 4.00, SD = 1.80) than
men (M = 3.25, SD = 1.76) and because prior research showed gender differences in responses to
anxiety-reducing interventions that were based on reminders of social support (e.g., Shnabel,
Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia, & Cohen, 2013), differences in means across experimental
groups were also examined with the means grouped by gender. Similar pattern of results
emerged as when the results were grouped by the other individual-differences variables assumed
to enhance sensitivity to social influences (or strengthen the influence of competence prime). As
seen in Figure 9, there was a trend for women in competence contingency condition to report
higher anxiety compared to women in non-task related contingencies; this trend was not
evidenced in men. The result of the analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety
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when the sample for the analysis was restricted to women was as follows: F(2, 109) = 3.017,
MSe = 3.143, p = .053, ηp2 = .052. Among women, the effect sizes were d = 0.54 for difference
between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.44 for difference between competence
and appearance contingency.

Figure 9. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and gender

Summed risk factors. Because of participant overlap among the six risk factors for
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies (45.4% of participants had four or more risk factors),
the results are also presented for one-way ANOVA conducted only with participants who had a
high number of risk factors (i.e., four or more). The assumption of homogeneity of variances was
not formally violated for this analysis, as assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances
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(p = .066). However, Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated that scores on anxiety were not normally
distributed in intrinsic acceptance contingency condition (p = .025); there were no formal
violations of normality for appearance acceptance contingency condition (p = .093) and
competence acceptance contingency condition (p = .079). With the analysis restricted to those
who had four or more risk factors, one-way ANOVA revealed a statistically significant main
effect of acceptance contingency condition, F(2, 85) = 4.234, MSe = 3.119, p = .018, ηp2 = .091.
Tukey HSD indicated that the mean level of anxiety in competence acceptance contingency was
significantly higher than the mean level of anxiety in intrinsic acceptance contingency, p < .05;
the other comparisons were not statistically significant. Among those with four or more
identified risk factors for susceptibility to acceptance contingencies, the effect sizes were d =
0.77 for difference between competence and intrinsic contingency condition, and d = 0.53 for
difference between competence and appearance contingency condition. Among those at low risk
of susceptibility to acceptance contingencies (i.e., those with three or fewer risk factors), the
effect sizes were negligible: d = 0.07 for difference between competence and intrinsic
contingency condition, and d = .10 for difference between competence and appearance
contingency condition. See Figure 10 for the means per group. These results suggest that the
hypothesized effects of acceptance contingencies on anxiety may apply only to individuals for
whom failure may result in perceptibly high loss of relational value.
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Figure 10. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and susceptibility to
acceptance contingencies

Differences in state self-esteem among contingency conditions. If activations of
representations of close others indeed shift participants’ self-esteem contingencies (Horberg &
Chen, 2010) and if possibility of taking an intelligence test makes one doubt one’s intellectual
abilities and if there are not substantial differences in the way that close others accept
participants or the way they evaluate them, it could be expected that those in the competence
contingency condition experience lower state self-esteem than those in the other conditions.
To examine this possibility, ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of the
experimental condition on self-esteem emotions, and on state self-esteem. The effect of condition
on self-esteem emotions was statistically non-significant, F(2, 191) = 1.014, MSe = .981, p =
.365, ηp2 = .011. For state self-esteem, the effect of condition was statistically significant, F(2,
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191) = 3.586, MSe = 2.218, p = .030, ηp2 = .036. However, the direction of the results was not as
predicted. A Tukey HSD follow-up procedure revealed that the mean for participants in
appearance acceptance contingency condition (M = 5.27) was statistically significantly larger
than the mean for participants in the intrinsic acceptance contingency condition (M = 4.58), p <
.05. This effect might have been obtained if the measure was sensitive to the way that the close
others evaluate participants. Intrinsic Acceptor was perceived to evaluate participants the most
positively on both competence and physical appearance; and Appearance Acceptor’s evaluation
of participants’ appearance was more negative than Competence Acceptor’s evaluation of
participants’ competence. Provided people respond defensively on measure of self-esteem to
being more negatively evaluated in the domain of activated acceptance contingency, the
observed effect might be obtained.
Study 2: Preliminary Analyses
As Study 1, Study 2 featured a number of checks. Because passing of what was deemed
to be the most important check to the manipulation (confirming that one recognized the name of
the close other in the visualization) already lowered the number of participants to an amount that
was smaller than the amount originally calculated as the necessary minimum for sufficient power
for the study, no other checks were used for exclusions. In total, 17 participants claimed not to
have recognized the close other they were asked to visualize, leaving 173 participants available
for analyses.
Perceived characteristics of the identified close others. The same considerations for an
effective prime of target acceptance contingency apply as in Study 1. Descriptive statistics for
the profiles of contingencies for each of the identified close others in this study are displayed in
Table 10, for desired closeness and frequency of thinking about the identified close others are in
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Table 11, for how the close others are perceived to evaluate participants’ competence and
appearance in Table 12, and for the relationship type the close others occupy with respect to the
participants in Table 13. The sample characteristics in this study overall mirrored the sample
characteristics in Study 1.

Table 10
Descriptive statistics for the extent to which the identified close others accept one based on
intrinsic qualities, appearance, and competence in Study 2
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes
Acceptance
Contingency

Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Intrinsic Acceptance

6.8

0.49

3.5

1.65

4.0

1.56

Appearance Acceptance

2.2

1.44

6.2

0.78

3.0

1.79

Competence Acceptance

3.0

1.72

4.1

1.73

6.4

0.76
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Table 11
Descriptive statistics for desired closeness to the identified close others and for frequency of
thinking about them in Study 2
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes
Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

Characteristic

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Desired closeness

4.3

0.75

2.8

1.28

3.3

0.93

Frequency of thinking
about the close other

5.2

1.07

3.5

1.67

4.1

1.47

Table 12
Descriptive statistics for how the identified close others are perceived to evaluate participants’
competence and appearance in Study 2
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes
Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

Characteristic

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Evaluates participant as
competent

6.3

0.75

5.3

1.24

5.6

1.32

Evaluates participant as
good-looking

5.6

1.13

4.6

1.66

4.5

1.18
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Table 13
Identified close others’ relationship to the participants in Study 2
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency
Primes
Intrinsic
Acceptor

Appearance
Acceptor

Competence
Acceptor

Percent

Percent

Percent

Acquaintance (not related to
school or career)

0.0

16.2

2.9

Friend (not related to school
or career)

38.7

33.5

19.1

Romantic partner

29.5

17.9

3.5

Family member (not a
romantic partner)

26.6

18.5

27.2

Professional relationship (for
example, a colleague or a
supervisor)

2.9

6.4

42.2

School-related relationship
(for example, a classmate or
a teacher)

0.0

2.3

2.9

Other

2.3

5.2

2.3

Relationship

Manipulation and attention checks. The attention check was passed by 96.3% of
Survey 2 participants. No breaks taken during the study were reported by 83.2% of participants.
Reading instructions very or extremely carefully was reported by 98.9% of participants. The type
of training program (i.e., intelligence training program) included in the instructions was correctly
recognized by 96.3% of participants. Participants confirmed that they recognized the close other
they were instructed to visualize in 91.1% of cases. Participants identically reclassified 94.2% of
close others with competence contingency, 96.3% of close others with appearance contingency,
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and 95.3% of close others with intrinsic contingency. Participants recalled at the end of the
survey the name of the close other they were asked to visualize in 97.9% percent of cases (3 of
the participants who did not recall the name typed the name of the animal they visualized).
Again, as in Study 1, the overall rate of passing these various checks was sufficiently high so as
not to cast doubt about participants’ lack of conscientiousness in responding to the survey.
Hypothesis guessing. Participants appear to have been unaware of the hypotheses of the
study. Only one person wrote that the study might be investigating the connection between the
visualized person and answers on subsequent questions.
Attrition. Seven individuals began the survey but did not complete it. Six of these
individuals reached at least the page with the visualization exercise of their close other (three
were in competence acceptance contingency condition, one in intrinsic acceptance contingency
condition, and one in appearance acceptance contingency condition).
Correlation between baseline self-esteem contingency on academics and effort
measures. There were no associations between self-esteem contingency on academics and any
of the effort measures: rs (171) = -.005, p = .952, for association with reading time 1; rs (171) = .042, p = .581, for association with reading time 2; and rs (171) = .095, p = .212, for association
with choice of the intelligence training package. Failure to find any association between selfesteem contingency on academics (which is assumed to index chronic level of acceptance
contingency) and the effort measures suggests that the measures for effort are inadequate
representations of the construct, effort is not related to acceptance contingencies under contexts
similar to the study, there are unexamined moderators of this relationship, or perhaps that the
measures are subject to the influence of too many other variables, making it difficult to detect the
relationship. Because chronic levels of acceptance contingencies are assumed to be stronger
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predictors of effects associated with acceptance contingencies than any differences between
experimental conditions that might have been induced by relational priming, the observed lack of
the associations suggests that the effect of the activated acceptance contingencies on the
measures of effort was unlikely to be obtained in this study.
Distribution of relevant variables. Distributions of the three main dependent variables
were examined for normality.
The distribution of choice of an intelligence training package was mostly bimodal, with
participants either choosing not to receive the package or to receive its most intensive form:
35.3% of participants chose to receive no package, 12.1% of participants chose to receive a
package for occasional practice, 10.4% of participants chose to receive a package for frequent
practice, 42.2% of participants chose to receive package for very frequent practice.
In order to ascertain whether the data is suitable for ANCOVA, the distributions of
reading times on articles 1 and 2 were examined for normality and equality of variances. There
was homogeneity of variances for reading time of article 1, as assessed by Levene’s test of
equality of variances, p = .303; on reading time of article 2, the assumption of homogeneity of
variances was violated, p = .027. As can be seen in Tables 14 and 15 as well as Figures 11 and
12, the data did not follow a normal distribution. There was a large positive skew in both reading
times, with reading time on article 2 additionally showing inflation around zero (representative
of participants’ decision not to read the optional article). Multiple outliers were also apparent.
The obtained data make the selected analytical method inappropriate; however, it was
used anyway due to the author’s inexperience with other statistical methods. Based on the visual
inspection of the distributions, it is not anticipated that there would be any differences among the
groups even if more appropriate analytical methods were employed.
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For means and standard deviations of variables used for confirmatory analyses of effects
on reading times, see Table 16.

Table 14
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of reading time on article 1 for acceptance
contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor
Shapiro-Wilk test
Cell
Statistic
p-value
Above-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency
.926
.145
Above-average closeness, Appearance contingency
.782
<.001
Above-average closeness, Competence contingency
.975
.700
Below-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency
.846
<.001
Below-average closeness, Appearance contingency
.585
<.001
Below-average closeness, Competence contingency
.469
<.001

Table 15
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of reading time on article 2 for acceptance
contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor
Shapiro-Wilk test
Cell
Statistic
p-value
Above-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency
.847
.006
Above-average closeness, Appearance contingency
.786
<.001
Above-average closeness, Competence contingency
.811
<.001
Below-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency
.848
<.001
Below-average closeness, Appearance contingency
.846
.001
Below-average closeness, Competence contingency
.636
<.001
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Figure 11. Histograms for distribution of reading time 1 by acceptance contingency condition
and by closeness to Competence Acceptor
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Figure 12. Histogram for distribution of reading time 2 by acceptance contingency condition and
by closeness to Competence Acceptor

Table 16
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the confirmatory analysis in Study 2
Variable
Reading time on article 1
Reading time on article 2 (optional)
Reading time on article 3
Desired closeness to Competence Acceptor
Note. The reading times are expressed in seconds.
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M
173.9
95.4
191.4
3.34

SD
149.56
111.52
219.40
0.93

Study 2: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort (Confirmatory Analyses)
Effects on selection of intelligence training package. A chi-square test of independence
was conducted between experimental condition and choice of a type of intelligence training
package (classified into three categories: no package, package for occasional or frequent
practice, package for very frequent practice). There was no statistically significant association
between the experimental condition and the choice of the intelligence training package, χ2 (4) =
1.51, p = .825.
Effect on reading time of article 1. A 3 (contingency: intrinsic vs. appearance vs.
competence) x 2 (desired closeness to Competence Acceptor: dichotomized at below-average vs.
above-average) ANCOVA was conducted to examine whether activating domain-specific
acceptance contingencies influenced participants’ effort as operationalized by reading time of
article 1, and whether this relationship was moderated by desired closeness to Competence.
Reading speed (reading time of article 3) was used as a covariate.
No statistically significant effects were detected. The interaction between desired
closeness and contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 166) = 0.376, MSe =
7257.131, p = .687, ηp2 = .005. The main effect of contingency condition was not statistically
significant, F(2, 166) = 0.125, p = .883, ηp2 = .001. The main effect of closeness was not
statistically significant either, F(1, 166) = 2.717, p = .101, ηp2 = .016.
Effect on reading time of article 2. The same analysis as for effect of acceptance
contingencies on reading time of article 1 was conducted for effect on reading time of article 2.
No statistically significant effects were detected. The interaction between desired
closeness and contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 166) = 2.169, MSe =
23560.265, p = .118, ηp2 = .025. The main effect of contingency condition was not statistically
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significant, F(2, 166) = 1.018, p = .364, ηp2 = .012. The main effect of closeness was not
statistically significant, F(1, 166) = 0.641, p = .424, ηp2 = .004.
Study 2: Exploratory Analyses
Differences in state self-esteem among contingency conditions. Reading about articles
that include information about the possibility to improve one’s intelligence might improve one’s
state self-esteem provided one’s acceptance is contingent on it (as it may mitigate doubts about
potential future changes in relational value due to one’s lack of intelligence). If this was the case,
it could be plausible that activation of competence acceptance contingency would increase state
self-esteem compared to activation of other acceptance contingencies.
For that reason, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of the
experimental condition on self-esteem emotions, and on state self-esteem. Neither the effects on
self-esteem emotions, F(2, 170) = .975, MSe = .733, p = .379, ηp2 = .011, nor the effects on state
self-esteem, F(2, 170) = 1.668, MSe = 1.854, p = .192, ηp2 = .019, were statistically significant.
Possible reasons for the failure to find any differences might have been, for example, due
to a lack of participants’ perceived relevance of the activated acceptance contingency to the
domain of the task, or due to reading of an article about possibility to improve one’s intelligence
not being a sufficiently strong stimulus as to improve one’s self-assessment of competence in the
absence of direct success feedback (similarly as perhaps a potential for failure at a task in Study
1 might not have been enough to worsen one’s self-assessment in the absence of any direct
failure feedback).
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Chapter 6: Discussion
Overview
The present studies were the first to examine the domain-specific impact of situational
activation of contingencies of acceptance on anxiety (Study 1) and effort (Study 2). In Study 1,
sample participants who were reminded of a close other whose acceptance was perceived to be
mainly contingent on competence reported greater anxiety about evaluative performance in the
domain of contingency (i.e., competence) compared to participants who were reminded of a
close other whose acceptance was perceived to be mainly contingent on a domain irrelevant to
the anticipated test (i.e., appearance) or unconditional; this relationship was not statistically
significant at a conventional level when the analysis was carried out for the whole sample but
was significant or approaching significance when carried out for certain theorized subgroups
(membership in these subgroups can be seen as indexing risk for susceptibility to influence of
acceptance contingencies; medium to large effect sizes were obtained for participants with four
of more of the six identified risk factors).
When analyses of the effects of experimental condition on anxiety were restricted to
subgroups of participants theorized to have greater general sensitivity toward social influences or
those for whom the prime of competence acceptance contingency is theorized to be particularly
strong, the effects emerged at p-values that ranged from .037 to .180. The Cohen’s ds for the
differences between the means were around 0.5. The effect size of this magnitude may be
considered substantial given the relatively brief procedure used to activate acceptance
contingencies and absence of specific mentioning of acceptance schema during the session when
anxiety was measured. This effect size is of practical significance because multitude of day-today reminders of one’s significant others may lead to large cumulative effects. The effect of
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experimental condition was statistically significant at a conventional level for the participants
theorized to be the most vulnerable to the potential exposure to the prime of competence
acceptance contingency (i.e., those who reported that the close other whose acceptance depends
on competence would value them less or much less if they became more incompetent). Given
that the results for the theorized subgroups emerged in consistent, predicted directions and given
that they are conceptually corroborated by prior research, these results may with caution be
collectively interpreted as providing initial support for the domain-specific effects of acceptance
contingency on anxiety. However, replication of the study with larger, more targeted sample will
be essential to obtaining stronger evidence. Overall, the findings of Study 1 shed light on factors
that may contribute to negative emotional experiences during pursuit of competence (as well as
perhaps other pursuits that may impact one’s relational value) and point to potential untapped
sources of resilience that individuals may be able to learn to draw upon if they are educated
about these mechanisms and trained to take advantage of them.
The Study 2 showed no effects of experimental condition on measures of effort and
intention to exert effort to improve one’s intellectual competence. Since the measures were not
even weakly correlated with baseline level of relevant domain of self-esteem contingency
(academics; self-esteem contingency is assumed to function as proxy for chronic level of
acceptance contingency in the given domain), these results suggest that the measures were not a
good representation of the target construct or that the relationship between acceptance
contingency and effort may be weak or non-existent (or a product of more complicated processes
than was anticipated).
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Limitations
One of the important limitations of present research is tied to inevitable issues that arise
in research that contrasts effects of activations of mental representations of other individuals
based on the individuals’ target characteristics. Namely, the primes for the target characteristic to
be activated may lack clarity, be contaminated with presence of characteristics that were
intended to be activated in other experimental conditions, or be confounded in their effects with
other correlated characteristics of the identified individuals.
Previous studies contrasting effects of primes consisting of mental activation of close
others (intrinsic vs. contingent) typically relied on the wording of description based on which
participants identified the primes; measures of the extent to which the desired characteristics
were actually obtained were not included (except for Horberg & Chen, 2010, who included only
participants who expressed at least moderate certainty about the close other possessing a given
acceptance contingency). For example, to ensure that the activated close others are comparable
with respect to how they like the participant, (Arndt et al., 2002) added specification that the
selected close other who fits given criteria of acceptance contingency profile also clearly likes
the participant; however, no measures as to the extent to which participants were able to identify
individuals who fit the criterion were included.
The measures included in present studies suggest that inclusion of a certain characteristic
in a wording of acceptance contingency profile is likely methodologically insufficient to infer its
presence in the identified individual and that measures should be included to enable estimation of
the extent to which suitable primes were obtained. For example, in the present study, there was a
clear evidence of presence of competence acceptance contingency in the appearance contingency
prime. That said, the present studies used a set of criteria that might have been more difficult to
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meet than criteria used in prior studies (prominent acceptance contingency in a given domain
compared to just general acceptance contingency).
In contrast to prior research, present studies also included a larger number of measures to
make it possible to identify and evaluate confounds that may need to be disentangled in future
research. For example, there were systematic differences in the types of relationships that the
identified close others had with respect to the participants. If participants experienced difficulties
more often in a particular type of relationship, the differences might have influenced the effects
of primes in unexpected ways because they could have primed negative affective reactions.
Some researchers have speculated that the type of relationship may be also important based on
the extent to which different relationships can be easily dissolved or replaced (Horberg & Chen,
2010), with relationships that would be difficult to dissolve or replace wielding larger influence.
Additionally, there were some differences in the way that the close others evaluated the
participants’ competence. Because primes of close others may influence participants’ perceived
competence at a task (Shah, 2003) and because lower perceived competence is associated with
greater anxiety, lower evaluation of participants in the eyes of the close others may have an
effect on participants’ anxiety. According to the participants’ perception, Intrinsic Acceptors
tended to view participants as more competent than did Competence Acceptors, which in turn
viewed the participants as somewhat more competent than Appearance Acceptors. However,
given that Appearance Acceptors were perceived to evaluate participants’ competence more
negatively but participants nevertheless tended to be more anxious in competence acceptance
contingency condition compared to appearance acceptance condition suggests that the way in
which the close others evaluated participants might not have been as important as the acceptance
contingencies the close others were perceived to possess.
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Another limitation is that no research today has demonstrated which aspects of
acceptance contingencies are particularly likely to elicit the effects of a given acceptance
contingency. It may be, for example, that for a given perceived acceptance contingency to exert
its effects, it needs to be perceived as being of a certain strength. Or, perhaps, in order for a given
acceptance contingency to exert effects, it needs to be sufficiently distinct from other acceptance
contingencies the close other is perceived to have—it is likely that akin to a goal being more
likely to be primed when there are no competing goals (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000), an
acceptance contingency may be more likely to be primed when there are fewer competing
acceptance contingencies. Because of the uncertainty about characteristics of the acceptance
contingency profile that can potentiate a given acceptance contingency, it is impossible to
evaluate the extent to which the obtained acceptance contingency profiles for the identified close
others actually led to activation of acceptance contingencies.
The procedure used to identify close others may also present challenge to ecological
validity of the way the effects of acceptance contingencies may be activated in real life upon
activation of representation of close others. While the visualization task is not assumed to alter
the effects that might result from real-world ways through which the close others might be
activated (spontaneous thinking about the close others; encounters of the close others in real life;
reminders of the close others through an activity associated with the close others; etc.), the
procedure used to identify the close others in the survey and obtain information about the close
others’ acceptance contingencies might have induced a level of self-reflection that is not
common for participants in daily life, and thus unduly exacerbated the level of acceptance
contingencies associated with the close others. However, the week-long separation between the
two survey administrations is assumed to have mitigated the effects of the reflective procedure.
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Additionally, while the procedure may complicate inferences to real-world activation
processes, it may be more representative of effects that might be evidenced if people were
trained to take advantage of thinking about close others with particular acceptance contingencies
(as such training would involve teaching participants about processes associated with acceptance
contingencies and self-reflection on the acceptance contingencies operative in their social
environment). Because of desire to draw inferences about feasibility of interventions, the
procedure is also superior to the procedure involving subliminal priming of close others
(subliminal and supraliminal priming procedures of close others have been shown to have
different impacts for a subset of participants who may be more likely to doubt their close others’
acceptance, i.e., anxiously attached participants; Mikulincer, Shaver, & Rom, 2011). A related
caveat with respect to ecological validity is that is also remains unclear whether effects would be
measurable in the context of more common daily tasks that may not have as powerful
consequences to one’s relational value as an intelligence test might.
The main objective of the studies was to examine impact of intrinsic vs. contingent
acceptance on dependent variables that were previously unexamined in the context of situational
activation of acceptance contingencies, and to compare greater level of general task-irrelevant
contingency with greater level of task-relevant contingency. For that reason, it was not deemed
necessary to include a measurement of the dependent variables in the absence of visualization of
close others. Yet, the lack of no visualization of close other condition makes it difficult to
ascertain whether observed effects represented a reduction or augmentation compared to no
visualization. That said, even if no visualization of close other condition was performed, making
such a judgment would be problematic because the relative effects might depend on the type of
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contingencies that are chronically accessible to participants, which may differ across different
populations and contexts even though the underlying mechanisms may be identical.
Nevertheless, it is recommended that future research examines the effects separately
under conditions in which baseline task-relevant acceptance contingency is assumed to be high
vs. low (or in which there is difference in the general level of threat to one’s relational value such
as when one suspects that one’s performance might actually be observable by others vs. not): it is
plausible that brief activation of task-relevant acceptance contingency exacerbates threats when
baseline task-relevant contingency is low but that when baseline task-relevant contingency is
high, replacement of task-relevant acceptance contingency with task-irrelevant contingency is
not a feasible mechanisms (the greater effects observed in subgroup of participants with higher
baseline self-esteem contingency on academics suggest that this is not the case though).
Additionally, the inferences about the domain-specificity of acceptance contingencies
would be strengthened if effects were also examined within a context of a task in a domain that is
different from competence. That said, there is no clear reason to assume that the specificity
would be evidenced only for competence but not for other domains.
There are also questions about the extent to which the measurements in the studies reflect
target constructs. As noted previously, self-reported anxiety may reflect greater selfhandicapping. Addition of physiological measurement of anxiety if the study is replicated in the
future in laboratory setting would mitigate the concern. Nevertheless, because self-handicapping
is reflective of the level of threat experienced, the inferences about the extent to which there are
domain-specific effects of acceptance contingencies on eliciting/mitigating threat should be valid
regardless of whether greater reported anxiety reflects greater anxiety or greater selfhandicapping. The validity of analogous inferences about processes in question in Study 2,
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however, needs to be questioned as the measures of effort did not correlate with baseline selfesteem contingency on academics. As an alternative explanation to the measure being a poor
representation of the construct, the lack of correlation in the study might have been caused by a
lack of instructions that would connect relevance of wider contingency of acceptance on
competence to improvement of intelligence. In Study 1, the description of the test of intelligence
explicitly connected importance of intelligence to outcomes connected to competence (such as
performance at school or at work); such a description was omitted in Study 2. This omission
might have caused the lack of correlation with the self-esteem contingency as well as observed
lack of effects of priming of acceptance contingencies.
Limitations of the present research also involve use of parametric inferential statistics for
data that violates multiple assumptions of the analyses that were carried out. Effect sizes and
judgments about statistical significance might have been affected because of the chosen
analytical methods.
Lack of Observed Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort
As explained above, the lack of observed differences among experimental conditions
might have been due to an insufficient connection between the domain of activated acceptance
contingency (competence) and the domain of the effort measures (intelligence). This could have
occurred if participants perceived that competence acceptance depends on actual school or
workplace performance but not on intelligence per se. The same issue might have occurred for
the lack of association of between baseline contingency of self-esteem on academics and the
effort measures.
Results of prior research suggest that relationship between self-esteem contingencies and
effort may be moderated by trait self-esteem, perceived difficulty of the task, as well as presence
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of feedback and its valence (Brook, 2005; Park & Maner, 2009). This may suggest that the
relationship of activated contingencies of acceptance to effort should be examined more
systematically with respect to contextual variables. For example, it is possible that activating
contingency of acceptance in a given domain increases effort only when participants have a need
to increase their relational value, perceive a clear connection between engaging in a task and
their relational value, and possess sufficient ability to engage in the task in a way that may
enhance their relational value.
Effects of Activated Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety
In the context of examination of a different dependent variable (i.e., anxiety), reports of
less anxiety following priming of Intrinsic Acceptor compared to Competence Acceptor
conceptually replicated prior research that showed less defensive responding following priming
of intrinsic acceptance compared to contingent acceptance (e.g., Arndt et al., 2002). The
observed trends in the direction of results also suggested that the effects of acceptance
contingencies might operate in domain-specific fashion; this was evidenced by somewhat
smaller amounts of anxiety following priming of Appearance Acceptor compared to Competence
Acceptor even though Appearance Acceptor was perceived as being more contingently
accepting. This may suggest that potential of performance on a task to change one’s relational
value may constitute a source of threat, and that the threat may be greater when the task is in the
domain that matches the activated domain of acceptance contingency.
The examination of the effects within various subgroups of participants additionally
contributed to the research on effects of situationally activated acceptance contingencies by
identifying potential moderators of the effects. The moderators included factors that may
strengthen the influence of the prime of contingent acceptance (desired closeness to the close
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other, frequency of thinking about the close other, the perceived magnitude of the extent to
which failure in the domain relevant to acceptance contingency would result in loss of relational
value, and contingency of self-esteem on the relevant domain) and factors that may index general
sensitivity to the influences of acceptance contingencies (need to belong and gender).
According to these results, the reminder of a close other with competence contingency is
more likely to elicit threat on a task related to competence when an individual desires closeness
to the close other, frequently thinks about the close other, and/or perceives that his or her value
in the close other’s eyes would substantially diminish if he or she were to perform poorly (note
that these inferences for moderators are made based on effect sizes and consistent direction of
results rather than statistical significance). These results are consistent with prior research that
showed moderation of effects of situationally activated domain-specific acceptance
contingencies by desired closeness (Horberg & Chen, 2010). Evidence of these relational
moderators strengthens the inference that the observed effects were due to acceptance
contingencies rather than other primed constructs. Future research should examine whether these
risk factors combine additively, multiplicatively, or simply function as thresholds for sensitivity
to acceptance contingencies. For example, it is plausible that greater desired closeness to the
close other matters only for individuals who perceive that their relational value would decrease
substantially in the close others’ eyes if they performed poorly.
Evidence of moderating role of need to belong is consistent with evidence of greater
sensitivity to social cues in individuals who are higher in need to belong (Pickett, 2004). Besides
enhanced sensitivity to detection of acceptance contingencies in the first place, it is additionally
plausible that those who are higher in need to belong are affected by any potential changes in
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relational value to a greater degree, thus diminishing the requirement of substantial potential for
loss of relational value in order to experience the effects.
There could be a variety of reasons for why women appeared to have responded to a
greater degree than men to the effects of the acceptance contingencies. One plausible reason is
that the difference was due to gender differences in qualitative features of cognitive
representations of social environment. While men tend to possess more categorical
representations of their social environment, women tend to possess more representations
involving specific relational exemplars within the larger categories (for example, when thinking
of important relationships for a particular relational group, men are more likely to think of
college community as a whole while women more of specific classmates; Foels & Tomcho,
2009). Provided these representations extend to general thinking about what it takes to be
accepted, women may perhaps have more developed representations of specific individuals, and
thus be more responsive to primes of specific individuals than men; or perhaps activation of a
specific individual is more likely to activate representation of a group as a whole for men, thus
diffusing profiles of activated acceptance contingencies. The difference might also have been
attributable to greater general tendency of women to report anxiety, or perhaps differences in
perceived abilities required to do well on an intelligence test. If women suspected they were
more likely to perform poorly than men, their perception of potential for loss of relational value
might have been greater, thus making them more sensitive to the effects of acceptance
contingency primes compared to men. It remains up to future research to examine whether men
who possess presently identified risk characteristics for susceptibility to acceptance
contingencies exhibit similar responses as women.
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While any conclusions drawn from the present work are largely tentative given what was
probably too small of a sample size because only a subset of participants appears to have
possessed characteristics that index sensitivity to activation of acceptance contingencies, the
evidence of smaller amounts of anxiety in competence-irrelevant acceptance contingency
conditions for those at an elevated risk to sensitivity to acceptance contingencies enables
speculations about practical significance of the findings for pursuit of competence and
improvement of well-being.
One of the most obvious practical implication of the current findings for educational
settings lies in connection of the findings to self-affirmation intervention (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel,
& Master, A., 2006). Self-affirmation intervention consists of writing about one’s important
values; its effectiveness in reducing anxiety-induced underperformance has been shown to be
mediated by the extent to which students mention belonging themes in their writings (Shnabel et
al., 2013). As the intervention appears to be effective only for certain subgroups of students
(such as women or Blacks) and has been even shown to have negative effects for other
subgroups (such as men, Miyake et al., 2010), the question emerges about whether there may be
differences in acceptance contingencies of the affirmed social connections among the groups.
The present work suggests that if a particular subgroup of students spontaneously tends to affirm
social connections with those perceived to have competence acceptance contingency, that
subgroup should benefit less or perhaps even be harmed by the intervention in the context of
competence-related tasks. Future research examining differences in acceptance contingencies in
groups for which the effectiveness of the intervention differs may help to account for the
differential effectiveness of the intervention. Future research might also assess whether the
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intervention is more consistently effective for larger segments of population if instructions are
adjusted in a way that reduces likelihood of activation of harmful acceptance contingencies.
The results also provide additional support for the importance of understanding
consequences of acceptance contingencies for well-being. Self-esteem contingency on academics
(which, as analyzed in the literature review, can be understood as an indicator of chronic level of
acceptance contingency on academics) is a predictor of depressive symptoms in students
(Sargent, Crocker, & Luhtanen, 2006). A large body of literature has documented the need to
belong and importance of its satisfaction for people’s well-being (e.g., León & Núñez, 2012;
Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). In order to satisfy the need to belong, people need
to perceive that they are close to the individuals important to them. However, failure at
relationally-activated acceptance contingencies diminishes the perceived closeness (Horberg &
Chen, 2010), and thus satisfaction of the basic need to belong.
Accordingly, evidence of influences of situational activations of different acceptance
contingencies suggests that an individual’s thinking patterns about close others may change the
extent to which particular acceptance contingencies wield influence over the individual, and
thereby the extent to which failures or potential failures affect well-being by means of depriving
satisfaction of the individual’s need to belong. If this is indeed the case, interventions that
encourage individuals to establish social ties to people whom they perceive as having acceptance
contingencies irrelevant to the domains in which the individuals frequently experience failure (or
in which they are afraid of failure) could improve the individuals’ well-being. In fact, it is
plausible, though admittedly still highly speculative, that well-being might be considerably
improved even in the absence of any new actual social connections if individuals are guided to
draw on reservoirs of strength present in their already existing social connections. The present
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work suggests that the individuals may do so simply by reminding themselves of their close
others who are perceived to have suitable profiles of contingencies of acceptance.
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